









Fiscal policy is interesting again.
As interest rates hit rock bottom during the global financial crisis, the burden
of lifting demand fell upon governments. This thesis explores three related
issues that have surfaced in the aftermath. Once the storm passed, decisions
had to be made about how fast and when to withdraw stimulus — chapter
two shows that implementing austerity may not always be plain sailing. How
much belt tightening is needed after a crisis? That depends crucially on the
amount of slack in the economy – revenue will grow and spending will fall
naturally as the economy recovers. The third chapter quantifies the challenge
of measuring the output gap in real time and shows how this carries over to
estimates of structural borrowing. Finally, the next crisis cannot be too far
away. But when should a government junk its budget plans and loosen the
purse strings? The trigger for that is the topic of chapter four.
In chapter two, I present a simple estimated model of the New Zealand econ-
omy which is used to assess the sensitivity of the impact multiplier and out-
put losses associated with fiscal consolidations to uncertainty over model
parameters. I find that, in normal times, the fiscal multiplier can be expected
to lie between 0.1 and 0.5, with a central estimate of 0.3. Uncertainty over
the output effects of fiscal tightening can be attributed to several model pa-
rameters and it is found that a bad outcome is likely to be worse than a good
outcome is to be better — output risks are skewed to the downside. Sen-
sitivity analysis reveals that if monetary policy in New Zealand were to be
constrained by the zero-lower bound, the fiscal impact multiplier would rise
substantially, consistent with the empirical evidence for other OECD coun-
tries in that position.
In chapter three I present a range of measures of slack in the UK economy.
It is shown that output gap uncertainty is substantial. Revisions owing to
the arrival of new data are on average of the same magnitude as the output
gap itself, while uncertainty arising from data revisions is found to make a
smaller contribution. Model uncertainty is pervasive and all types of output
gap uncertainty carry over to measures of structural borrowing. Assuming
the Brainard Principle holds, the enormous margin of uncertainty over the
cyclical position of the economy calls for caution in fiscal policymaking.
Chapter four assesses a novel rule that was introduced in the UK in 2015.
It gave the British government fiscal flexibility whenever GDP growth war-
ranted it. This rule lasted just a year, but it had features worth exploring.
I apply solution methods for models with occasionally-binding constraints
to assess the demand stabilisation properties of state-contingent fiscal rules.
First it is shown that fiscal flexibility can make recessions shallower. Second,
it is suggested that GDP growth, rather than measures of the output gap, is
probably the best indicator for triggering fiscal flexibility.
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policy, potential output, output gap, uncertainty, real time, fiscal policy, pro-
ductivity, Ricardian equivalence, SVAR, consolidation, uncertainty, zero lower
bound
For Helen and in memory of Wendy Perren.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Christoph Thoenissen, my supervisor, for putting me on the right
path at various times and, of course, for all the flat whites. I’m indebted
to Tugrul Vehbi, Girol Karacaoglu and anonymous referees for support and
guidance during my time in New Zealand working on chapter two. To Andy
King, Stephen Nickell, Robert Chote and the Office for Budget Responsi-
bility advisory panel for helpful suggestions on chapter three. And to Dan
Hanson for inspecting endless simulations with me and bouncing ideas back
and forth on chapter four.
Finally, thanks to the New Zealand Treasury, the Office for Budget Respon-
sibility and Bloomberg for allowing time for me to work on this.
Contents
Contents v
List of Tables ix
List of Figures xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Parameter uncertainty and the fiscal multiplier in a small open economy 7
2.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Modelling methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 IS relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 Phillips curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 The real exchange rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Central bank reaction function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.7 Credit spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7.1 Model equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.9 Model Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.10 A baseline fiscal consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.11 Measuring parameter uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11.1 Some parameters that matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11.2 Some parameters that matter less . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.11.3 How much better or worse might it be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.12 Fiscal policy at the zero-lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.13 Implications for policy research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.14 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Output Gap Uncertainty in the United Kingdom: A Fiscal Perspective 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1.1 Conceptual issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
v
CONTENTS vi
3.1.2 Time horizon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.1.3 Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.4 Assessing performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.2 Univariate Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.1 Linear de-trending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.3 Prior-constrained (PC) filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.4 Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.5 Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.6 Hamilton filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.7 Comparison of univariate methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Multivariate methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 The multivariate PC filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.2 Philips curve-augmented PC filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.3 Okun’s law augmented PC filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.4 Capacity utilisation-augmented PC filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3.5 Multivariate filter model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.6 Principal components analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.3.7 Aggregate composite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.8 Credit-Augmented Principal Components Analysis . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.9 Production function approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.3.10 Summary Statistics for the Estimation Methods . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Quantifying Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.1 Model Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.2 End-point Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.4.3 Data Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.4 Summarising Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5 How Smooth is Potential Output? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6 Mapping to the Public Finances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.8 Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.8.1 Estimating the structural rate of unemployment . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.8.2 Estimating potential average hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.8.3 Estimating potential activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.8.4 Taking account of market sector information . . . . . . . . . . . 102
CONTENTS vii
4 Modelling State-Contingent Fiscal Rules in the United Kingdom 107
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.1.1 The Golden Rule — 1998 to 2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.1.2 Temporary Operating Rule — 2008 to 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.1.3 Fiscal Responsibility Act — Feb 2010 to June 2010 . . . . . . . . 109
4.1.4 Fiscal Mandate and Supplementary Target - 2010 to 2015 . . . . 110
4.1.5 A Conditional Fiscal Rule - 2015 to 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.1.6 A Return to Deficit Targets - 2016 to... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.2.1 Part 1: Modelling Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.2 Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.2.3 Other Applications of the Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3.1 Fiscal Regime-Switching Model with a Growth Knock-Out . . . . 124
4.3.2 A Fiscal Regime-Switching Model with an Output Gap Knock-Out124
4.4 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.4.1 Part 1: The benefit of fiscal flexibility with a growth knock out . . 126
4.4.2 Part 2: The benefit of fiscal flexibility with an output gap knock out128
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5 Conclusions and future work 131
5.1 Summary of findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131




2.1 Estimated Model Parameters and Priors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Estimated Model Parameters and Priors continued. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Sign Restrictions for SRVAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4 Cumulative output losses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1 Statistical properties of output gap estimation methods . . . . . . . . . . 86
ix
LIST OF TABLES x
List of Figures
2.1 Output impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Inflation impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 Interest rate impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Exchange rate impulse responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Baseline simulation dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6 Baseline fiscal effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.7 Variations in output responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 Variations in fiscal effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.9 Scenarios relative to baseline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.10 Parameter contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.11 Fiscal impact multiplier at the lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1 Linear-detrended estimates of output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Linear-detrended estimates of potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3 HP Filter estimates of output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 HP filter estimates of potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Prior-contrained filter estimates of output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Prior-constrained filter estimates of potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.7 Hamilton filter estimates of output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.8 Hamilton filter estimates of potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.9 HP, PC and H filter real-time output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.10 HP, PC and H filter real-time potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.11 Univariate ex-post output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.12 Univariate ex-post potential growth estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.13 PC Filter and Phillips-augmented filter estimates of real-time output gaps 65
3.14 PC Filter and Phillips-augmented filter estimates of ex-post output gaps . 66
3.15 PC Filter and Phillips-augmented filter estimates of real-time potential
growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.16 PC Filter and Phillips-augmented filter estimates of ex-post potential
growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.17 PC Filter and Okun-augmented filter estimates of real-time output gaps . 69
3.18 PC Filter and Okun-augmented filter estimates of ex-post output gaps . . 69
3.19 PC Filter and Okun-augmented filter estimates of real-time potential growth 70
xi
LIST OF FIGURES xii
3.20 PC Filter and Okun-augmented filter estimates of ex-post potential growth 71
3.21 PC Filter and capacity utilisation-augmented filter estimates of real-time
output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.22 PC Filter and capacity utilisation-augmented filter estimates of ex-post
output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.23 PC Filter and capacity utilisation-augmented filter estimates of real-time
potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.24 PC Filter and capacity utilisation-augmented filter estimates of ex-post
potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.25 PC Filter and multivariate filter estimates of real-time output gaps . . . . 74
3.26 PC and multivariate filter real-time trend growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.27 PC Filter and multivariate filter estimates of ex-post output gaps . . . . . 75
3.28 PC and multivariate filter ex-post trend growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.29 PC and PCA ex-post output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.30 PC and PCA ex-post potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.31 PC and AC ex-post output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.32 PC and AC ex-post potential growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.33 BCBS Credit Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.34 PC and credit filter ex-post output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.35 PC and credit filter real-time output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.36 Production function output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.37 Production function potential growth estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.38 Output gap contributions (i)– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.39 Output gap contributions (ii)– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.40 Potential TFP level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.41 Potential TFP growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.42 Swathe of output gap estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.43 Tendency for revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.44 Volatility of output gap estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.45 Volatility of potential growth estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.46 Revisions vs potential output growth volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.47 Effect of data revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.48 Sources of output gap uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.49 Sources of output gap uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.50 OECD output gap vintages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.51 HM Treasury and OBR output gap vintages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.52 Swathe of CAPSNB measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
LIST OF FIGURES xiii
3.53 CAPSNB revisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.54 Real-time NAWRU estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.55 Ex-post NAWRU estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.56 Estimates of potential average hours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.57 Estimates of potential activity rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.58 Whole economy and market sector output gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.59 Market sector and whole economy gap differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.60 Whole economy and market sector TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.61 Whole economy and market sector potential TFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 Kalman filter decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.2 Demand and supply shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3 Fiscal policy stance under two rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 Fiscal Discretion Can Make Recessions Shallower . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5 Fiscal Discretion Keeps Inflation Closer to Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.6 An Output Gap Rule Could Provide Additional Flexibility . . . . . . . . 129
4.7 Economic Recovery May Have Happened Sooner . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129




Each of the chapters of this thesis was intended to answer a specific question relevant to
policy at the time of writing.
Chapter two concerned the possible impact of fiscal tightening in New Zealand when
the government was embarking on a substantial program of consolidation. Austerity
carries big risks, but those are lessened when monetary policy has room to provide a
cushion. As it happens, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand did have room to provide a
cushion and, in retrospect, the fiscal consolidation looks to have been a success. Chapter
two was peer-reviewed by anonymous academic referees from around the globe and pub-
lished in 2013 as a New Zealand Treasury Working Paper - Parameter Uncertainty and
the Fiscal Multiplier.
Chapter three addressed a specific problem, too. As slack in the economy is used up,
there is a boost to revenue and spending falls, relative to GDP. So how much fiscal effort
is required to put the public finances on a stable footing depends crucially on estimates
of the output gap. The trouble was that the British government depended on just two
measures of slack and neither appeared credible at the time - both pointed to overheating
when there was strong evidence of spare capacity in the labor market.
The third chapter developed a robust multivariate Kalman filter model of potential
output to supplement other indicators of slack, quantified the margin of uncertainty in
both real time and in retrospect and showed how output gap uncertainty carries over to
1
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estimates of the structural budget deficit.
Chapter three was peer-reviewed by the Office for Budget Responsibility’s panel of
external advisors and published in 2014 as an OBR Working Paper - Output Gap Mea-
surement: Judgement & Uncertainty. The model developed in chapter three is still used
today as an important input to the OBR’s forecast process.
Chapter four, again, responded to an important and relevant policy question. When
should governments junk their fiscal rules and support the economy instead? In 2015 the
U.K. government offered a testable benchmark policy prescription - that fiscal policy can
be relaxed when growth dips below 1%. Still, if GDP growth slows because potential
output slows, this rule could let governments spend when they shouldn’t. If however
growth decelerates for cyclical reasons, maybe looser policy is the right course of action?
The fourth chapter tested whether GDP growth or the output gap works best as a
trigger for fiscal relaxation - the former seems to be just as good if not better.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Chapter Two
The global financial crisis and fiscal responses to it created large and persistent struc-
tural deficits - those which persist once output has returned to potential - in many ad-
vanced economies. As economic recoveries began, governments had to decide how fast
to withdraw stimulus and shrink underlying deficits. Too fast and the recovery would be
choked off in its infancy. Too slow and there was seemingly a risk of punishment from
creditors.
In normal times fiscal multipliers appear to be relatively small. And if tightening
is signalled in advance, monetary policy can work to offset the drag on demand. But
there are occasions on which that will not be possible. If, for example, monetary policy
is less effective than usual. The fact is that policymakers do not know what the impact
of fiscal measures will be at any given point in time. The models used to judge those
impacts generally assume stable parameters. After all they are supposed to be ‘deep’ -
determined by structural features of the economy and preferences that do not change over
time.
To illustrate the risks, chapter two presents a small, estimated model of the New
Zealand economy. To estimate the model I use Bayesian techniques. This allows for the
inclusion of prior beliefs, drawn from the literature, about the model parameters but also
brings to bear what the data have to say. I use a Kalman filter to estimate the likelihood
function and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws from the posterior
distribution.
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I find that the mean estimates of the model parameters do not always lie in the centre
of the distribution, which means the data are consistent with a skewed distribution. That’s
useful information because it gives an indication of where the risks to that estimate lie.
To illustrate those risks I run fiscal policy simulations and vary the model parameters
using the confidence intervals from the Bayesian estimation process.
What I find is that monetary policy is crucial, which chimes with the other literature
on the topic. The parameters governing both the degree of monetary activism and the
sensitivity of output to movements in interest rates have skewed distributions. In other
words, consolidate the public finances at a time when monetary policy is unable to pro-
vide a cushion or at a time when households and businesses are less incentivised to spend
by lower interest rates, and the impact could be very substantial.
The other key parameter is the degree of Ricardian equivalence - how much house-
holds and businesses tighten their belts when fiscal policy tightens. If the economy is
depressed and households are unable to dip into savings, for example, fiscal tightening
might have a bigger impact on growth.
Chapter Three
Governments need economic forecasts if they are to plan how much they are going
to spend in years to come. To understand how big the economy will be and, therefore
how much revenue will flow into the Treasury, three things are needed. An estimate of
trend growth, an estimate of the output gap, and a forecast for how close demand will be
to the economy’s supply potential. In truth, all forecasts embody these features, either
explicitly or implicitly.
Chapter three focuses on the second judgement - the margin of slack in the UK econ-
omy. As the unemployed return to work, more income taxes are paid and less is spent on
social welfare. It’s obvious that this is important to forecasts of the public finances. But
there are other forms of slack, too. What if demand is so weak that employers shorten
shifts? Or if some factory production lines are closed down until such a time as demand
is sufficiently strong to merit switching them back on? All of this is slack, and it all
matters to the public finances.
In chapter three I develop a measure of the output gap using a multivariate Kalman
filter. It incorporates a wide range of information about slack, including inflation capacity
utilisation and joblessness. And it leaves scope for the application of judgement about
which of these indicators is most important or reliable. I show, however, that all estimates
of the output gap are associated with trade-offs — those that tend to be revised by less
may give a misleading signal more often, and those which are more flexible in their
interpretation of new data tend to be revised a lot.
The conclusion is that a wide range of evidence should be considered in judging
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the outlook for the economy. It is also shown that output gap uncertainty carries over
substantially to estimates of structural borrowing and that revisions to estimates have
more to do with the arrival of new data than the refinement of earlier data.
Chapter Four
History shows that governments are pragmatic in times of crisis. The UK Treasury
was very quick to act during the global financial crisis, abandoning its fiscal rules and
administering stimulus to the economy. It was obviously the right thing to do faced with
such a big shock. What if the next shock were to be smaller? Would the government be
criticised for deviating from its fiscal rules when tightening in a downturn would make
things worse? Or might a modest slowdown be exploited to help the government pump
prime the economy before an election.
In 2015, the UK government cleared up what it defined as significant shock, worthy
of delaying fiscal tightening: growth of less than 1%. It no longer uses that benchmark,
but the question remains - is it a good one?
Chapter four uses a solution method for models with occasionally-binding constraints
and applies that to a model with a state-contingent fiscal rule. It is shown that downturns
are shorter when fiscal policy is relaxed – perhaps an obvious conclusion. Still, it is also
shown that GDP, which is more quickly available and less prone to revision, is probably
a better trigger for fiscal flexibility than the output gap.
Contributions of the thesis
These are threefold:
• Fiscal tightening can be costly, but the risks are vastly reduced if monetary policy
can act as a cushion to demand;
• Output gap uncertainty is pervasive in the U.K. and it’s best to draw upon a range
of information to inform estimates of slack and not to reject any simply due to
revision properties; and
• A growth trigger to permit fiscal flexibility can help shorten downturns and looks
at least as good if not better for identifying major shocks than are estimates of the
output gap.
Structure of the thesis
The material in this thesis is presented in five chapters including the introductory
chapter.
Chapter two presents an estimated model of the New Zealand economy. Simulations
are run using the confidence intervals for each estimated parameter to illustrate the risks
surrounding fiscal consolidations. Chapter three develops a suite of estimates of the out-
put gap, culminating in a multivariate Kalman filter for the U.K. The revisions properties
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of each are assessed and it is shown how output gap uncertainty carries over to estimates
of the structural deficit. Chapter four sets out a regime-switching model of the U.K.
economy with a growth knockout to determine when fiscal policy may be relaxed. It is
shown that a growth trigger shortens downturns and looks at least as good an indicator of
significant shocks as the output gap. Chapter five concludes.
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2
Parameter uncertainty and the fiscal
multiplier in a small open economy
2.1 Literature Review
The global financial crisis, which began in 2008, led to a significant deterioration in the
fiscal positions of many governments, with a number of advanced economies running
substantial budget deficits in the years that followed. Because much of the loss of output
associated with the financial crisis is judged to be permanent, this has led to governments
running persistent structural deficits – those expected to remain once the economic cycle
has run its course and output has returned to its steady-state growth path.
Many governments have responded to the deterioration of their fiscal positions by
planning large consolidations – usually a mix of spending cuts and tax increases, with
most balanced towards the former. A natural question to ask is to what extent might
these plans reduce aggregate demand in the economy and, in doing so, slow its cyclical
recovery? Besides explaining the origins of the financial crisis and the implications for
policy settings, answering this question has become one of the major focuses of macroe-
conomists in recent years.
Estimates of the size of the fiscal impact multiplier range widely, as do the tech-
niques used to assess them. Estimation methodologies tend to fall into two categories:
the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach, pioneered by Blanchard & Perotti
(2002), and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling, as recently ap-
7
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plied by Davig & Leeper (2011). The former approach draws inferences from statistical
relationships identified in the data. To reveal the underlying relationships, a number of
assumptions about the way the economy functions are applied during the estimation pro-
cess. The DSGE approach involves the specification of a model, derived from economic
theory, and the calibration of that model’s parameters either via estimation or through
the application of judgement. The size of the impact multiplier is then derived from the
simulation properties of the model.
During the financial crisis, the IMF Lall et al. (2009) published estimates of the size
of fiscal impact multipliers for a number of advanced economies, which averaged around
0.5. Using a DSGE approach, Mountford & Uhlig (2009), also find the multiplier to be
around 0.5. While the original SVAR estimate of Blanchard & Perotti (2002) is consis-
tent with an impact multiplier of around unity. Another approach, recently applied by
Blanchard & Leigh (2013), has been to decompose forecast errors made during periods
of fiscal retrenchment into the part related to exogenous shocks and the part related to the
assumed fiscal impact multiplier. The estimate associated with this method is consistent
with a fiscal impact multiplier of around unity.
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) apply the SVAR methodology using a large data set which in-
cludes a number of economies with different characteristics. They find that the multiplier
depends critically on the degree of development, the monetary policy framework and the
degree of openness. Crucially, their estimate of the multiplier is not significantly differ-
ent from zero for countries with a flexible exchange rate and they find the multiplier is
smaller for more open economies.
Corsetti et al. (2012) also find that the monetary policy and exchange rate regime
are important in determining the effect of fiscal policy. But the exchange rate is found
to appreciate in response to a positive government spending shock. In most models, the
exchange rate plays a stabilising role by boosting output at times of fiscal tightening by
bringing about a fall in the relative price of domestically-produced goods. The finding
calls into question the assumed transmission mechanism and role of the exchange rate.
New Zealand is a small open economy with a flexible exchange rate. Taking an SVAR
approach, Parkyn & Vehbi (2014) find a statistically significant impact multiplier of 0.3
associated with a change in government spending, rising to 0.6 when debt dynamics are
excluded.
A recent study, Ramey (2019), asking what has been learned from the last ten years
of fiscal research compares three different and widely applied methods of multiplier esti-
mation. It is found that that the results vary widely. In other words, model uncertainty is
pervasive. But correcting for some known shortcomings that have emerged in the litera-
ture in recent years suggests a band for expenditure multipliers of between 0.6 and unity.
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Still, that finding is by no means universally accepted.
One conclusion that can therefore safely be drawn from the expansive literature on
the subject is that the size of fiscal multipliers is extremely uncertain. And as Castelnuovo
& Lim (2019) put it, in a recent and exhaustive survey of the literature, the consideration
of state-dependent multipliers has become the norm. The bottom line remains that policy
makers need to have some view about the likely effects of discretionary fiscal policy and
what the risks surrounding it are. With this in mind, I ask ‘Under what conditions might
the impact of a fiscal tightening be bigger or smaller?’
To answer this question I estimate a small, reduced-form model of the New Zealand
economy, using Bayesian methods. I then conduct fiscal policy simulations by varying
a number of the key model parameters and assess the output effects using two metrics.
The first is the fiscal impact multiplier, which represents the degree to which a fiscal
consolidation might slow GDP growth and widen the output gap.1 But to explore the
broader effect on social welfare, I also consider the cumulative output loss associated
with a fiscal tightening. This takes into account both the degree to which a consolidation
might reduce output and the time it takes to return to its steady state growth path. The
intention is to give a quantified estimate of the risks associated with fiscal consolidations
based on the degree of uncertainty about the way the New Zealand economy functions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I discuss the choice of modelling
methodology in Section 2.2, before explaining the theoretical underpinnings governing
the dynamics of the model. Section 2.8 is concerned with the estimation of the model,
including the choice of priors. Section 2.10 sets out the key findings of the fiscal consol-
idation simulations before Section 2.13 assesses the implications of the results for policy
making. Section 2.14 concludes.
2.2 Modelling methodology
There are a number of ways in which to develop a model of the economy, the suitability
of which depends upon its intended use. One type of modelling method is the DSGE
approach, referred to above. Such models, often used by central banks, are typically quite
large and strictly adhere to the prescriptions of their microeconomic foundations. That
is to say that, whether it’s a model with three equations or twenty, the laws of motion
of the economy are governed by the optimising behaviour of agents operating within
it. DSGE models tend to fall into two categories – real business cycle models, which
treat all deviations from steady state as optimal responses to shocks, and, so-called, New
1In this paper the fiscal impact multiplier is defined as the change in the output gap over a period of
one year associated with a 1 per cent of potential GDP fiscal tightening.
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Keynesian models, which attribute some of the deviation to nominal rigidities. The model
presented here can be considered a reduced-form version of the latter.
The strength of micro-founded models is that the equations are based on optimising
behaviour and so should be robust to changes in policy – the dynamics of the model are
driven by ‘deep’ or structural parameters.1 However, models featuring forward-looking
equations tend to underperform simple autoregressive models and, quite often, little em-
pirical support is found for the hypothesised underlying relationships.2 This is partly
because many of the variables move with a degree of inertia that is inconsistent with
the adjustment paths implied by forward-looking, rational expectations models. In these
models, it is the rational but immediate adjustment of households’ expectations to innova-
tions which implies jump responses, which are rarely seen in the data. To overcome this
problem, many DSGE models feature adjustment costs and other mechanisms introduced
with the intention of replicating the inertial responses of the data.
All economic models are misspecified, since they represent a simplification of reality.
And while the model presented in this paper is deliberately small, with the objective of
parsimony and tractability in mind, it is also likely to be particularly prone to misspecifi-
cation. Recognising this, I attach structural interpretations only loosely to the parameters
of the reduced-form model, since many of them capture broader influences on the vari-
ables to which they pertain.
The four key variables of interest are the output gap, bank rate, the inflation rate
and the real exchange rate; given by the investment-saving (IS), Taylor, Phillips and real
uncovered interest parity (RUIP) relations respectively. In what follows, I present the
baseline functional forms adopted for the core equations and identify where the assump-
tions are consistent with the microeconomic theory upon which they are founded and
how that translates into the functional form of the reduced-form model. For reference,
a complete set of the equations that constitute the model can be found at the end of this
section and descriptions of the data used to estimate are presented in the annex.
2.3 IS relation
The IS equation relates output in the economy to deviations of the real interest rate from
the level consistent with stable output and inflation in the medium term. Equations of
this form are a staple of macroeconomic modelling and appear, in some form, in all
New-Keynesian models.
1As opposed to being based on statistical relationships identified in the data, which may not be stable
over time
2See Fuhrer & Rudebusch (2004).
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The standard forward-looking consumption IS relation is given by,
ct = αcct+1|t − αr + ct (2.1)
Where
rt = it − pit+1|t (2.2)
Equation 2.1 represents the baseline consumption Euler equation that arises from the
representative household’s optimisation problem. It has been log-linearised around its
steady state so ct represents the deviation of consumption from its steady-state growth
path, ct+1|t is the expected deviation of consumption from its steady state, conditioned
on information available at time t, rt is the real interest rate gap and ct is an independent,
identically-distributed consumption shock. The nominal interest rate and expected rate
of inflation are given by it and pit+1|t , respectively.
The consumption Euler equation simply states that, in equilibrium, the representative
household is unable to increase its utility by shifting consumption between periods — that
is, the marginal utility of consumption today is balanced with the discounted marginal
utility of consumption tomorrow.
Such an equation implies the immediate adjustment of output as households update
their expectations. In practice, consumption appears to react quite slowly to changes in
interest rates, for example, and a number of studies attempt to explain this behaviour. One
such endeavour is the habit formation model of Fuhrer (2000). Fuhrer postulates that the
utility derived from consumption depends both on the absolute level of consumption and
the level of current consumption relative to past consumption - that households do not
like consuming less than they have been and initially resist changes, before eventually
adjusting. This modification was shown to substantially improve the fit of the model.1
Other work, predominantly concerned with why the behaviour of consumption ap-
pears to invalidate the permanent income hypothesis, such as Muellbauer (1988), sug-
gests that households may be myopic in their consumption choices. Campbell & Mankiw
(1989) offer the hypothesis that households do not have the resources to engage in pro-
ducing full forecasts and so it is optimal for them to use a rule of thumb when updating
their consumption plans in response to income shocks.
That lagged output improves the fit with the data is important, but whether one accepts
the habit formation story, the rule of thumb hypothesis or simply assumes that households
are less forward-looking than is often suggested, is less important for the specification
of the IS relation. In empirical work, an assumption of habit formation or myopia in
1See, for example, Giannoni & Woodford (2004) for a formal derivation of the habit formation-
augmented NKIS relation
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household consumption choices is not uncommon and both Batini & Haldane (1999) and
Smets & Wouters (2003) allow for it in their respective models of the UK and the euro
area economies. Indeed, neither Carlin & Soskice (2010) nor Ryan et al. (2009) include
expected output in their baseline IS relations for the UK and New Zealand respectively.
With this in mind, I introduce persistence to the output gap process by assuming a
degree of external habit formation in consumption (given by αc) — while acknowledging
that the true source could be myopia, rule of thumb behaviour or a failure of rational
expectations, resulting in an equation of the form,
ct = αcct−1 + (1− αc)ct+1|t − αrrt + ct (2.3)
To capture the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on the economy I allow for the
possibility of non-Ricardian behaviour, in a similar way to Ratto et al. (2007). Ricardian
behaviour states that, faced with a reduction in taxes, for example, households will tend
to save the associated additional income since they know it heralds higher taxation or
lower spending in the future. The effect on permanent incomes is zero and, therefore, so
is the output response. In this model I allow for non-Ricardian behaviour by specifying
the proportion of households who are affected by discretionary fiscal policy.
The consumption of Ricardian households does not respond to changes in public
spending and taxation so changes in the fiscal balance do not feature in the consumption
equation and this is given by the standard IS relation presented in 2.4, but Ricardian
consumption is denoted by a superscript R.
cRt = αcc
R
t−1 + (1− αc)cRt+1|t − αrrt + ct (2.4)
Non-Ricardian households spend all the additional income/reduce consumption by
the full extent of the fiscal tightening and so the change in the fiscal stance is introduced
to the consumption equation, where represents the fiscal impulse - a similar measure to
the change in the cyclically-adjusted budget balance.1,
cNRt = αcc
NR
t−1 + (1− αc)cNRt+1|t − αrrt + ft + ct (2.5)
The proportion of non-Ricardian households is indexed by the parameter, αNR, giving
rise to the aggregate consumption equation
ct = (1− αNR)[αccRt−1 + (1− αc)cRt+1|t − αrrt + Rct ]
+αNR[αcc
NR
t−1 − (1− αc)cNRt+1|t − αrrt + ft + NRct ] (2.6)
1This is defined as the change cyclically-adjusted budget balance plus the change in the level of capital
expenditure as a share of GDP. A full methodology for the construction of the data set can be found in
Philip & Janssen (2002) Broadly, this measure is intended to capture the change in the fiscal position
arising from discretionary policy measures.
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Separating out the term capturing the change in the fiscal stance,
ct = (1− αNR)[αccRt−1 + (1− αc)cRt+1|t − αrrt + Rct ]
+αNR[αcc
NR
t−1 − (1− αc)cNRt+1|t − αrrt + +NRct ] + αNRft (2.7)
and then aggregating the remaining Ricardian and Non-Ricardian terms gives:
ct = αcct−1 + (1− αc)ct+1|t − αrrt + αNRft + ct (2.8)
Based on its structural interpretation, the indexing coefficient, αNR, should be bounded
by 0 and unity. But there how much output changes in the short run for a given discre-
tionary policy measure may depend on the precise policy package. There are several
ways to bring about a structural adjustment in the public finances. These include revenue
measures, such as consumption or income tax changes, and spending measures, such
as changes in departmental expenditure or welfare policies. In practice, each of these
measures is likely to be associated with a different multiplier, since they tend to affect
different groups in society, for example. In this sense, households, in aggregate, might
be less ’Ricardian’ in their response to some measures than to others.
A comprehensive analysis would estimate different αNR parameters for different
types of policy measure. This would not be practical here, since I focus only on New
Zealand and the time series with which I am working are relatively short. There sim-
ply is not enough variation in the series to provide reliable estimates at a granular level.
Instead, I focus on the overall (average) fiscal impact multiplier and use changes in the
government’s cyclically-adjusted budget balance to estimate its size. This is consistent
with the estimated parameter relating to the direct effects of a fiscal policy package of
average composition.
Furthermore, because the effects of fiscal policy on the net trade position are not ex-
plicitly articulated in the model, the effects of such ‘leakages’ are reflected in the estimate
of the parameter αNR. In what follows, I describe this coefficient as the degree of non-
Ricardian behaviour but readers should be aware that, due to the reduced-form nature of
the model, this parameter captures more than this structural parameter alone — another
way to think of it may be as the direct fiscal impact multiplier, before any offset from
monetary policy, for example.
In this model, the fiscal policy stance is determined exogenously and follows an au-
toregressive process,
ft = ζfft−1 + 
f
t . (2.9)
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This specification is intended to account for the autocorrelation introduced by interpo-
lating annual fiscal data. To get from the consumption Euler equation to the IS equation I
assume that the behaviour of the consumer can explain whole-economy behaviour. This
is a common assumption in small models of the economy but is not completely satis-
factory given, in particular, the contribution of business and inventory investment to the
cyclical volatility of output.
Without deriving the behaviour of firms explicitly from microeconomic foundations
here, it suffices to say that the change in output associated with firms’ responses to
changes in real interest rates is in the same direction as that implied by the response
of households. Intuitively, if the real rate of interest falls, this lowers the cost of bor-
rowing and increases the overall rate of return of an investment project. Therefore, any
profit-maximising firm has a greater incentive to invest.1
There are a number of extensions to these simple theories, which highlight the role
of uncertainty and irreversible costs in the investment decision — see Leahy & Whited
(1995) and Pindyck & Solimano (1993), for example. Like habit formation in consump-
tion, these extensions serve to increase the persistence of the model. While these theo-
ries are not articulated within the modelling framework here, the cyclicality of business
investment and its contribution to output volatility should already be captured by the
reduced-form parameters of the IS relation.
Aggregating the consumption Euler equation to the whole economy level gives equa-
tion 2.10. In the spirit of Gali & Monacelli (2005), I also include a term for changes in
the trade-weighted real effective exchange rate, which is intended to capture the effect on
output of changes in relative prices which serve to shift the allocation of resources to and
from the export-facing sector,
yt = αyyt−1 + (1− αy)yt+1|t − αrrt−1 − αq∆qt−1/t−4 + αNRft + yt .2 (2.10)
yt is the output gap, yt+1|t is the expected output gap at time t and rt−1 is the real
interest rate gap, ∆qt−1 is the change in the lagged real expected exchange rate gap and
yt is an independent and identically-distributed aggregate demand shock. I include four
lags of the change in the real exchange rate to allow output to respond slowly to changes
in relative prices.
1Tobin’s q theory of the investment decision, Tobin (1969), operates in a similar way. Lower expected
interest rates decrease the rate at which income streams are discounted, increasing the valuation of compa-
nies’ net assets. When the market value of assets exceeds the book value, there is a profit opportunity and
companies expand their investment until such a time that book prices are equal to market prices.
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2.4 Phillips curve
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) relates current inflation to expectations of
future inflation and marginal cost pressures. That the inflation process is forward-looking
follows from the price-setting behaviour of firms, which is assumed to follow Calvo
(1983). The basic premise is that in each period a firm has a fixed probability that it
will keep its prices unchanged, so firms set prices now with a view to the future because
they know that they may not be able to change their prices in the subsequent period.1
The probability of changing/not changing price each period is independent of the time
elapsed since the firm last changed its price, and this attribute simplifies the aggregation
of individual firm behaviour to the whole-economy level. This gives an equation of the
form,
pit = βpipit+1|t + βyyt + 
pi
t (2.11)
where pit is the rate of inflation and pit+1|tis the expectation of inflation conditioned
on information available at the current time.
I assume that real marginal cost pressures drive the inflation process, consistent with
Clarida et al. (1999) and that these cost pressures are well-represented by the output gap,
yt. There are other measures which could be used - Batini et al. (2005) use the labour
share of income in their estimate of the Phillips curve, which has the advantage of being
directly observable.2 But using the labour share for forecasting with this model would not
be possible because it does not capture the evolution of the labour market, so the output
gap is preferred. The error term, pit , is an independent, identically-distributed inflation
shock.
As with the IS relation, the purely forward-looking version of this equation fits the
data poorly — failing to capture the observed inertia of inflation. The equation specifica-
tion implies that persistence in either movements in the output gap or changes in inflation
expectations could produce an inertial path for inflation, but leaves open the possibility of
large jumps. It also implies that inflation should lead the output gap, which is the opposite
of what we observe in the data; both empirical evidence and conventional wisdom sug-
gests that monetary policy affects inflation only with a lag, rather than instantaneously.3
A model that does not adequately capture the persistence of inflation would not fit
the data and have misleading simulation properties. Therefore, in what follows, I relax
1 Note that this probability is independent of the general level of inflation. This seems unlikely, and
has implications for the model, such as the potential non-neutrality of money.
2It is also the case that, under certain assumptions, the labour share (the average product of labour) is
proportional to real marginal cost in an economy characterised by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
3See Rudd & Whelan (2007) for a detailed discussion of this point.
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the restrictive assumption that households and firms are completely forward-looking and
anchor expectations of inflation to the middle of the Reserve Bank’s target range.
The hybrid version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, used in a number of em-
pirical estimates of the equation Galı & Gertler (1999) modifies the standard NKPC for-
mulation by allowing a proportion of firms to use a rule of thumb when setting prices,
consistent with a degree of indexation in price setting. This modification provides a the-
oretical justification for the presence of an inflation lag in the first order condition of
the NKPC. Intuitively, the inclusion of lags of inflation serves to act as a proxy for the
rational expectation of future values of the driving variable. The resulting equation there-
fore includes a backward-looking term and a coefficient, βpi, that determines the weight
placed on past inflation relative to inflation expectations in the inflation process,
pit = βpipit−j + (1− βpi)pit+j|t + βyyt−j + pit (2.12)
The restriction placed on the inflation coefficients summing to unity (effectively im-
posing a discount factor of one) means that money is super-neutral in this model. It also
implies that the coefficient, βpi, can be interpreted directly as the proportion of firms in
the economy that set prices in a backward/forward looking manner.
In this paper I take a slightly different approach to the Gali & Gertler set-up and adopt
the prior expectation that agents in the economy expect that monetary policy is able to
return inflation to target at some time horizon (typically assumed to be around two years).
Because the target is a constant, expectations drop from the equation.
pit = βpipit−j + βyyt−j − βq∆qt−j + pit (2.13)
To allow for the effect of exchange rate pass-through to prices, I include lags of the
change in the real trade-weighted exchange rate.1 That the Phillips curve can be aug-
mented in this way is demonstrated formally in Batini et al. (2005) and Gali & Monacelli
(2005).
Finally, linearising around the target rate of inflation gives the Phillips curve in ’in-
flation gap’ terms.
pit = βpipit−1 + βyyt − βq∆qt−1/t−4 + pit (2.14)
2.5 The real exchange rate
In specifying the dynamics of the real exchange rate, I begin by setting its medium-term
anchor. In the long run, the nominal exchange rate is thought to move in such a way that
1It is assumed that the real exchange rate is proportionate to the terms of trade — i.e. that the elasticity
of substitution between domestically-produced and foreign goods is equal to unity.
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prices between two countries are equalised. That is to say that capital will flow between
countries such that relative unit labour costs are equalised and that the relative demand
for currency acts to push the nominal exchange rate so that price differentials gradually
erode, albeit with a wedge arising from transport costs. Such a medium-term relationship
is known as relative purchasing power parity (PPP) where, the nominal exchange rate is
given by the ratio of domestic to foreign prices and a permanent wedge. Linearising
around this steady state and taking logs gives the long-run PPP steady state condition,
et = p
∗
t − pt (2.15)
The short-run dynamics of the nominal exchange rate, et, are given by the uncovered
interest rate parity condition (UIP),
et = et+1|t + it − ift (2.16)
where the nominal exchange rate gap is given by the expected nominal exchange
rate one period ahead and the relative interest rate between New Zealand and a foreign
country.
Substituting in the real exchange rate identity, qt = et + pt − p∗t , gives the real-UIP
(RUIP) condition,
qt − (pft − pt) = qt+1|t − (pt+1|t − pft+1|t) + it − ift . (2.17)
And solving for the real exchange rate gives
qt = qt+1|t + (it − pit+1|t)− (ift − pift+1|t) + qst (2.18)
Gali & Monacelli (2005) include a similar equation in their open-economy model and
convergence with a steady state is achieved by iterating forward, such that the expecta-
tions term drops out of the equation. Because they linearise around long-run PPP this is
consistent with agents in the economy expecting long-run PPP to hold in subsequent pe-
riods. In practise, deviations of the observed real exchange rate from that consistent with
long-run PPP can persist for long periods of time and it is thought that convergence with
PPP is slow. To allow for this empirical observation I include a convergence parameter,
kappq, which weakens the pull from the steady state in the short term. Compared with
the G&M model, this specification increases the responsiveness of the exchange rate to
interest and inflation shocks, consistent with the high degree of volatility associated with
the New Zealand Dollar.
Taking the RUIP equation, linearising around long-run PPP and introducing a con-
vergence term gives the equation,
qt = qt+1|t + (it − pit+1|t)− (ift − pift+1|t)− ψqqt−1|t + qt (2.19)
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The equation is based on the notion that, if a real interest rate differential exists,
the real rate of return on domestic and foreign assets is equalised by movements in the
exchange rate. The assumption of convergence with long-run PPP is consistent with
more sophisticated models. For example, in macro-balance models of the exchange rate,
short-run dynamics are typically governed by some version of real or nominal uncovered
interest parity. But, in the medium term, the real exchange rate moves to stabilise a
country’s net international investment position.1
In this model, foreign interest rates follow an autoregressive process and, in steady-
state, are equal to the steady-state domestic nominal interest rate,





For the purposes of including changes in the real exchange rate in the IS relation it
is necessary to have a forecast of foreign inflation. This too follows an autoregressive
process and is assumed to have a steady-state rate consistent with the domestic inflation






Given the share of primary goods in New Zealand’s exports, it is perhaps unsurprising
that commodity price changes influence the exchange rate. To allow for the effect of







2.6 Central bank reaction function
Taylor (1993) observed that the conduct of monetary policy can be well-captured by
a simple rule relating interest rates to inflation and the output gap. Following Taylor’s
paper there began a concerted academic effort to assess this class of policy rules and their
implications for optimal monetary policy. However, some form of Taylor’s original rule,
which is entirely backward-looking, remains the default specification for the behaviour
of the central bank in many economic models.
The IS and Phillips relations described above operate with a lag. That is to say, it
takes time for interest rates to affect the output gap and, in turn, for inflation to respond
1Larger-scale DSGE models, such as that of Harrison & Oomen (2010) ensure that the real exchange
rate converges with its steady-state value by applying a risk premium to net foreign asset holdings in the
UIP equation. Such an assumption is also consistent with relative PPP holding in the medium-term.
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to the output gap. The lag structure embodied in these equations means that monetary
policy should be conducted with a view to the future. Therefore, given the involvement
of the central bank in forecasting the economy and the lags associated with the conduct
of policy, I specify a forward-looking form of the Taylor rule which is consistent with
the other equations in the model — the Bank’s expectations are assumed to be model-
consistent.
As well as being a reasonable empirical description of the conduct of monetary pol-
icy, Svensson et al. (1997) and others have shown that the Taylor class of rules can also
be derived from the inflation targeting central bank’s optimisation problem. Simply al-
lowing for the lag structure associated with the monetary transmission mechanism gives
a forward-looking Taylor rule of the form,
it = i¯t−j + δyyt+j|t + δpi(pit+k|t − pi∗), (2.23)
where it is Bank Rate, i¯t−j is the equilibrium nominal rate of interest,yt+j|t is the
output gap forecast at the relevant time horizon and pit+k|t is the forecast deviation of
inflation from target.1,2
Unlike the IS and Phillips relations, I do not include an exchange rate term in the
specification of the Taylor rule. In this model, the central bank responds to movements
in the exchange rate only indirectly, via its effect on output and domestically-generated
inflation. This is consistent with both New Zealand’s Policy Targets Agreement and
the Taylor (2001) finding that the inclusion of exchange rates does little to improve the
stabilisation of output and inflation and is possibly detrimental.
A substantial literature also exists on the observed inertia of interest rate setting by
central banks around the world, see for example Goodfriend (1991). In what follows, I
adopt the same approach as Galı & Gertler (1999)), which is to assume the presence of
a policy rate smoothing parameter in the central bank’s reaction function. They suggest
this smoothing arises from a desire to avoid the credibility costs associated with large
policy reversals, a desire to minimise disruption to capital markets and the time it takes
build a consensus to support a policy change.3
Later discussions have identified ways in which interest rate smoothing might be op-
timal for a central bank in the presence of parameter uncertainty. Svensson (1999), for
1The specification is slightly different from the original Taylor rule but consistent with Nelson &
Nikolov (2004).
2I use effective bank rate in place of actual bank rate to account for the effects of credit spreads and
unconventional monetary policy on lending rates to the wider economy.
3In a rational expectations context, Woodford (2000) also shows that it can be optimal for a central
bank to move the current policy rate less in response to demand and inflation shocks if, at the same time,
the changes are characterised by a high level of persistence. This way, agents in the economy expect
interest rates to be lower for longer once they have been cut, in turn lowering longer-term interest rates as
well as short rates.
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example, shows that parameter uncertainty for an inflation-targeting central bank damp-
ens the policy response, confirming what Brainard (1967) first described. So¨derstro¨m
(2002) extends this analysis to a dual-mandate central bank with output in its loss func-
tion. He finds that uncertainty over inflation dynamics tends to heighten the response
to inflation deviations (in case expectations become unanchored) but uncertainty over
output dynamics encourages caution.
Regardless of the precise motive, the inclusion of central banks’ smoothing of policy
rates in their reaction functions significantly improves the fit with the data. Equation 2.24
captures interest rate inertia as in Clarida et al. (1999),
it = (1− δi)i∗t + δiit−1 (2.24)
where it is the interest rate set, ψ is the smoothing parameter, i∗t is the interest rate
implied by the reaction function (absent smoothing) and it−1 is the interest rate set in the
preceding period.
Substituting the generalised Taylor rule in to equation 2.21 as the i∗t term gives the
central bank reaction function with policy rate smoothing equation 2.25,
it = (1− δi)¯it + (1− δi)δyyt+j|t + (1− δi)δpi(pit+j|t − pi∗) + δiit−1 + it (2.25)
I choose a forecast horizon of 6 months for the output gap and a year and a half for
inflation, consistent with conventional wisdom over the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy. Linearising equation 2.25 around the steady-state interest rate and inflation
target gives the ’nominal interest rate gap’ equation,
it = δiit−1 + (1− δi)δyyt+2|t + (1− δi)δpi(pit+6|t) + it (2.26)
2.7 Credit spreads
Since the onset of the recent financial crisis, a rise in the perceived degree of risk associ-
ated with lending and borrowing has significantly widened the gap between the interest
rate set by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the price of credit available to the
wider economy. As a result, monetary policy has subsequently taken serious account of
the effect of credit spreads on the behaviour of agents in the economy.
While the existence of a credit spread is not important to the running of fiscal policy
simulations (since there is no hypothesised relationship between credit spreads experi-
enced by the wider economy and discretionary fiscal policy) it is important to the estima-
tion of the model. To exclude the effect of higher credit spreads would miss important
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information relevant to the monetary policy decision and the real interest rate faced by
households and businesses.
The inclusion of credit spreads in the model presented here is based on a simple prin-
ciple: the Reserve Bank is ultimately concerned with the interest rates paid by household
and firms in the economy. So if the spread of interest rates experienced by agents in the
wider economy over policy rates is higher than usual, this implies that the Bank would
set policy rates lower than usual. Therefore, rather than targeting policy rates, in this
model, the Bank takes credit spreads into account directly and targets an adjusted policy
rate, described here as Effective Bank Rate, iet .
By extending the baseline New-Keynesian model of the economy to include a mea-
sure of credit spreads, Cu´rdia & Woodford (2016) show that agents in the economy re-
spond in a similar fashion to increases in borrowing rates arising from changes in the
default risk premium as they would to an increase in Bank Rate.1 Importantly, the C&W
model shows that, so long as central bankers take credit spreads into account, the Taylor
class of policy rules remains optimal in choosing the stance of monetary policy.
To construct a measure of the credit spread, I use a selection of quoted household
borrowing and deposit rates and subtract from those the relevant reference rate of inter-
est.2 For example, I take the average interest rate quoted for a 2-year fixed-rate mortgage
and subtract from this the two-year government bond rate. This gives the spread over
expected policy rates at the relevant time horizon.3
In this paper, the model is presented in terms of deviations around a steady-state.
Therefore, the credit spread series should also be expressed in terms of deviations around
a steady-state. For simplicity, I assume that the steady-state credit spread is stationary
around its long-run average value.
The evolution of the credit spread is given by
cst = θcs(cst−1) + cst (2.27)
where is assumed to follow an autoregressive process that reverts to an equilibrium
mean value of zero.4
The effective interest rate is defined as,
iet = it + τcscst (2.28)
1The authors create a model which assumes that banks are able to finance themselves by issuing de-
posits which must attract the same rate of interest as government bonds of the same maturity to avoid
arbitrage opportunities. In this paper I assume that the relevant spread is over the cost of borrowing, as
set by the central bank. This approach is motivated by the observation that the Bank targets a policy rate
defined in terms of very short-term government borrowing rates.
2Ideally, a measure of credit spreads would also include corporate sector borrowing and deposit rates,
but there is little data available with which to construct such a measure.
3Insofar as the two-year government bond rate is a good proxy for expectations of policy rates.
4i.e. it is exogenous, as in the Curdia-Woodford model.
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where the coefficient, τcs, allows for the possibility of a rise in credit spreads affecting
consumer behaviour more or less than a corresponding move in bank rate.
Credit spreads enter the model in two places: the IS relation and the Taylor rule. The
real interest rate gap, which features in the IS relation, becomes,
rt = i
e
t − pit+1|t (2.29)
and Taylor rule becomes,
it = δiit−1 + (1− δi)δyyt+2|t(1− δi)δpi(pit+6|t) + (1− δi)δcscst + it (2.30)
The Taylor rule is augmented to allow the central bank to respond to deviations of the
credit spread from its steady state. When the coefficient, δcs, is equal to unity, the Bank
treats the increase in the credit spread as equivalent to an increase in bank rate. Values
not equal to unity allow for a partial or excess response of policy rates to credit spreads.
Since the bank’s expectations are model consistent, the effect of the credits spread on
the economy and the bank’s policy response are constrained to be consistent with one
another,
δcs = τcs. (2.31)
2.7.1 Model equations
All equations are log-linearised around a steady state — i.e. output gap, inflation devia-
tion from target...
yt = αyyt−1 + (1− αy)yt+1|t − αrrt−1 − αq∆qt−1/t−4 + αNRft + yt (2.32)
pit = βpipit−1 + βyyt − βq∆qt−1/t−4 + pit (2.33)
it = δiit−1 + (1− δi)δyyt+2|t + (1− δi)δpi(pit+6|t) + it (2.34)
qt = qt+1|t + (it − pit+1|t)− (ift − pift+1|t)− ψq + qt (2.35)
cst = θcs(cst−1) + cst (2.36)










ft = ζfft−1 + 
f
t (2.39)
δcs = τcs. (2.40)
iet = it + τcscst (2.41)








While some models are parameterised using estimated coefficients, others are calibrated
to fit certain aspects of the data. With a model this small, incomplete specification is
unavoidable — there are features of recent economic history that cannot be explained
within the very narrow modelling framework considered here. But this does not mean
it cannot be used for quantitative assessment. It simply implies that accepting the esti-
mation results without some sensitivity to information that is available outside the small
model would likely lead to bias.
Likewise, simply choosing the model parameters by applying judgement or with ref-
erence to theory would ignore the useful information contained within the data. Bayesian
estimation serves as a bridge between calibration and estimation – the selection of priors
allows for the incorporation of additional information available to the modeller, while the
process of maximum likelihood estimation extracts some value from the data. In prac-
tice, the priors serve to guide the maximum likelihood estimate by placing more weight
on certain areas of the parameter space. And the chosen prior variance acts to determine
the weighting between the prior and the unconstrained maximum likelihood estimate
contained within the posterior estimate.
My choice of prior distributions for the model parameters is informed by other studies
relating to the New Zealand economy including, Lubik & Schorfheide (2007), Ryan
et al. (2009), Parkyn & Vehbi (2014) and Karagedikli et al. (2013). I also refer to the
simulation properties of the New Zealand Treasury Model and Reserve Bank of New
Zealand forecasting models – see Szeto et al. (2003) and Benesˇ et al. (2009).
There is good reason to suspect that the dynamics of the model associated with the
exchange rate are muddied by commodity prices. International evidence such as that
presented in IMF (2012b) suggests that domestic output is positively correlated with
commodity prices for exporters of primary goods, such as New Zealand. Because the
exchange rate is also correlated with commodity prices the exchange rate is positively
correlated with output — which is not consistent with theory.
The introduction of commodity prices - which are so persistent as to be indistinguish-
able, in practice, from a random walk - would affect the stability of the reduced-form
modelling and VAR results. Instead, my priors over the exchange rate — drawn from
evidence from other, larger models of the New Zealand economy, that include the effect
of commodity prices — are imposed more strictly than priors relating to other parameters
of the reduced-form model.
With regard to the Bayesian estimation process, I use data from the final quarter of
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making use of data over the recent recession. The likelihood function is estimated using
the Kalman filter and the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to generate draws from
the posterior distribution. 100,000 draws are run with the first 25,000 discarded as burn
in. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 presents both the choice of priors and the posterior estimates of the
model parameters.1
The data used in the estimation process were sourced and transformed as follows.
The output gap is presented as a percentage of real GDP and is sourced from Szeto et al.
(2013). The interest rate is the deviation from the sample average and sourced from the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The real exchange rate is a composite of weighted bilat-
eral rates, sourced from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Statistics New Zealand.
Inflation is quarterly annualised CPI inflation sourced from statistics New Zealand and
seasonally adjusted. The credit spread is the deviation of sample average of composite
lending rates weighted by shares in lending - each sourced from the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand. Foreign policy interest rates are sourced from Reuters and trade weighted
and expressed as a deviation from the sample mean. The same is true of foreign inflation,
which is also seasonally adjusted. The fiscal impulse is the change in cyclically-adjusted
budget balance. This is sourced from the New Zealand Treasury and interpolated to a
quarterly frequency.
2.9 Model Evaluation
The estimation results do not throw up a huge number of surprises. The persistence of
the output gap is a little higher than the prior but still some distance from being a random
walk. And, of course, monetary policy acts as an additional force to bring demand in line
with the economy’s supply potential. The posterior estimate of the interest rate elasticity
of demand is rather lower than the prior, suggesting monetary policy has a smaller impact
on aggregate spending than expected. Still, it has an important stabilising role to play in
the model.
The impact of the exchange rate on demand is broadly in line with the prior. The
degree of non-ricardian behaviour is a little lower than the prior. That’s an interesting
finding. The effect of tax and spending changes on output varies depending on the type
of measure being implemented and this parameter can be thought of as the fiscal impact
multiplier. It’s worth remembering, then, that the estimated parameter will reflect the
impact of the mix of fiscal policies implemented on average in the past. The width of the
confidence intervals will also reflect the possibility that the impact has varied over the
past, depending on the composition of measures.
1Estimation is conducted using the DYNARE software package.
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To evaluate the fit of the model I first estimate a two-lag SVAR model, which allows
the data to speak with the minimum number of identifying restrictions applied. The data
series included are the inflation deviation from target, the output gap, the real interest
rate gap and the exchange rate gap, which is also the Cholesky ordering of the variables.
Fiscal policy enters the SVAR exogenously since it does not theoretically depend on any
other variable in the model.
I then compare the impulse responses from the SVAR with those of the estimated
reduced-form model. I find that, broadly speaking, the impulse responses are consistent
with one another. In particular, the humped responses of inflation to the output gap and
the output gap to interest rates receive good empirical support. The dynamics of the
exchange rate and the associated influences on output are less well-supported. Overall,
the SVAR impulse responses generally support the dynamics of the reduced-form model
– that’s illustrated in Figures 2.1,2.2,2.3 and 2.4.
To provide an alternative model against which to compare the impulse responses, I
estimate a sign-restricted VAR (SRVAR) in a similar way to Ja¨a¨skela¨ & Jennings (2011).
The associated impulse responses are presented alongside the responses of the other mod-
els below). The restrictions are presented in Table 2.3.
The interest rate response to itself is assumed positive given the persistence of interest
rates - that’s also reinforced by the smoothing parameter that features in most estimated
reaction functions. Inflation is assumed to respond negatively to rates, and the exchange
rate jumps as predicted by UIP. The output gap is also persistent, justifying the positive
restriction on itself and higher output causes the labor market to tighten, lifting wages
and costs. Inflation and exchange rate shocks prompt replies in line with the general
theoretical predictions of a New Keynesian model.
The restrictions serve to eliminate both the exchange rate and price puzzles associ-
ated with the VAR estimates and leaves the magnitude of many of the impulse responses
broadly consistent with those from the reduced-form model1. However, the approach
also introduces an excess sensitivity of the exchange rate to endogenous factors, prob-
ably reflecting misspecification and the omission of relevant variables in the estimation
process.
Finally, I am also interested to see whether the cross-equation restrictions of the
reduced-form model have a significant bearing on its dynamics. To investigate whether
this is the case I run a stochastic simulation of the model and record the data that is
generated. I then estimate another SVAR using that simulation data - the identification
is achieved using the same ordering as in the SVAR described above - and compare the
1The drawback of this approach is that the sign restrictions appear to make the responses more imme-
diate, since they apply to the first lag of the VAR — this is also a feature of the sign-restricted estimates
presented in Jaaskela and Jennings)
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Figure 2.1: First figure - response of output to an output shock. Second figure
- response of output to an inflation shock (1 standard deviation). Third figure -
response of output to an interest rate shock. Fourth figure - response of output to
an exchange rate shock – (1 standard deviation).
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Figure 2.2: First figure - response of inflation to output shock. Second figure -
response of inflation to an inflation shock (1 standard deviation). Third figure -
response of inflation to interest rate shock. Fourth figure - response of inflation to
an exchange rate shock – (1 standard deviation).
2.9. MODEL EVALUATION 30
Figure 2.3: First figure - response of interest rate to output shock. Second figure -
response of interest rate to an inflation shock (1 standard deviation). Third figure
- response of interest rate to an interest rate shock. Fourth figure: response of
interest rate to an exchange rate shock (1 standard deviation).
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Figure 2.4: First figure: response of exchange rate to an output shock. Second
figure - response of exchange rate to and inflation shock (1 standard deviation.
Third figure - response of exchange rate to an interest rate shock. Fourth figure
response of exchange rate to an exchange rate shock (1 standard deviation).
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Table 2.3: The table shows the identifying restrictions for the sign-restricted VAR. Col-
umn to the left shows the variable that is being shocked. The row to the top shows the
type of shock. The cells show the sign restriction pertaining to that shock.
Shock to: Interest rate Output Inflation Exchange rate
Interest rate Positive - Negative Positive
Output - Positive Positive -
Inflation Positive - Positive Positive
Exchange rate - Negative Negative Positive
impulse responses with those of the estimated model. I find that the impulse responses
are broadly consistent with one another, suggesting the findings presented later are not
overly dependent on the cross-equation restrictions of the reduced-form model.
2.10 A baseline fiscal consolidation
In this section, I first set out a fiscal policy simulation using the estimated model param-
eters, which serves as the baseline case against which other simulations are compared. I
then vary the model parameters one at a time, to show the sensitivity of the fiscal impact
multiplier and associated cumulative output losses to those parameters. The variations
are proportionate to the confidence intervals obtained during the Bayesian estimation
procedure, which serve as proxies for parameter uncertainty.
The baseline fiscal consolidation scenario presented here is based on a four-year con-
solidation program equal to a one per cent of GDP tightening in each year, starting one
quarter after it is announced. The full consolidation is, therefore, expected by the central
bank, foreign exchange market participants and households. Figures 2.5(a) and 2.5(b)
illustrate the dynamics of the four key model variables in response to a scheduled fiscal
consolidation.
The figures show that the exchange rate depreciates at the point of announcement,
while interest rates fall with a degree of inertia. The level of prices rises initially, reflect-
ing the increase in import costs associated with the currency depreciation. The exchange
rate depreciation provides support to output over the first year; thereafter the output gap
opens up and exerts downward pressure on the annual rate of inflation. The output gap
continues to widen over the period of fiscal consolidation, implying a negative GDP
growth effect and a positive fiscal impact multiplier.
Figure 2.5 shows that the fiscal impact multiplier is small in the first year as much
of the effect of the consolidation is offset by the output effects of currency depreciation.
Thereafter, the multiplier rises to around 0.4 before shrinking to around 0.3 toward the
end of the consolidation period. The average fiscal impact multiplier over the consolida-
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Figure 2.5: Top: Interest and exchange rates In both figures the bars show the size of
the fiscal tightening being administered as a percentage of GDP. In the top figure the dark
line shows the movement of the exchange rate in reply and the dashed line shows the
response of interest rates. In the bottom figure the solid line is inflation and the dashed
line is the output gap. Bottom: Output and inflation
tion period is also 0.3.
The opening of the output gap is associated with a cumulative loss of income of
around 6 per cent of annual GDP — illustrated in Figure 2.6. This output will never be
recovered since there is no offsetting positive output gap following the consolidation —
i.e. the level of output returns to its steady-state growth path and remains there.
The risks associated with speed of consolidation are not quantified here. Varying the
pace of the fiscal consolidation by, for example, compressing the duration over which
it takes place to two years does not yield a larger estimated cumulative output loss or a
larger fiscal multiplier. The implication is that fiscal policy can be set without any regard
to speed of consolidation and, in effect, makes achieving fiscal balance today just as
costly as achieving it over four years — this is a limitation that arises from the linearity
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Figure 2.6: Top: Fiscal impact multiplier The top figure shows the size of the fiscal im-
pact multiplier in each of the years when a four-year tightening program is administered.
The bars show the impact as a percentage of GDP. The bottom figure shows the sum
of output losses made in each year as a percent of annual GDP. Bottom: Cumulative
output loss
of the model.
Adjusting the baseline scenario so that the consolidation starts in a year’s time (rather
than the next quarter) affects the profile of GDP growth over time. This is because the
exchange rate adjusts at the point of announcement, not when the consolidation begins,
which means the associated benefits to growth are felt before consolidation begins. But
this simply brings demand forward from later years and, overall, the cumulative gains
associated with preannouncement are small — equal to around 0.1 per cent of annual
GDP over the period in which the consolidation takes place.
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2.11 Measuring parameter uncertainty
I have used the confidence intervals from the Bayesian estimation for the relevant param-
eters as proxies for parameter uncertainty. Table 2.4 ranks the model parameters by the
cumulative output losses (relative to baseline) associated with a one standard deviation
variation from their respective estimated values1. The mean estimates for each of the
model parameters do not always lie precisely at the centre of their estimated confidence
intervals.
2.11.1 Some parameters that matter
The degree of monetary activism is captured by the responsiveness of interest rates to
both the output gap and deviations of inflation from target. The persistence of the output
gap is affected by variations in both of these parameters and the risks posed by both the
fiscal impact multiplier and cumulative losses are skewed to the downside.
The interest rate elasticity of demand represents the willingness of households to
swap consumption today for consumption tomorrow. It is important because it deter-
mines how effective a given interest rate change will be in stimulating aggregate demand
and variations in this parameters alter the persistence of the output gap. The results show
that the risks posed to both the cumulative output losses and associated fiscal impact
multipliers are skewed to the downside when this parameter is varied.
The degree of non-Ricardian behaviour2 introduces considerable uncertainty over
the likely effect of fiscal consolidation on the economy. This is not surprising since it
is the scalar for the size of the initial shock. The results are consistent with a broadly
symmetric loss/gain in cumulative output and varying this parameter has a roughly equal
effect on the impact multiplier when varied in both directions.
The output gap paths associated with independently varying each of the four pa-
rameters above by one standard deviation of the parameter estimate are presented in
Figure 2.7(a) while Figure 2.7(b) shows these in terms of deviations from the baseline
scenario. The simulation shows that a higher degree of non-Ricardian behaviour would
reduce output sooner and more sharply than would a lower interest rate elasticity of de-
mand or interest rate sensitivity to the output gap/inflation. This is reflected in estimates
of the fiscal impact multiplier illustrated in Figure 2.8.
1To some extent, the confidence intervals reflect the priors for the standard error of the parameters but
the data also influences these ranges.
2Which includes the effect of other leakages
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Figure 2.7: Top: Output gap simulations Both figures show the different responses of
output to the same fiscal shock under different model parameters. In separate simula-
tions one standard deviation is added or subtracted to the estimated model coefficients
– the degree of Ricardian equivalence, the interest rate elasticity of demand, the per-
sistence of the output gap and the persistence of inflation. The top figure shows the
estimated responses. The bottom shows the difference between those responses and
the baseline simulation. Bottom: Output gaps relative to baseline
2.11.2 Some parameters that matter less
Several parameters affect the distribution of GDP growth over the consolidation period
but not the cumulative output losses associated with it. Exchange rate variables, for
example, affect the impact multiplier in the first year but work in the opposite direction
in later years as the initial depreciation is offset by appreciation to achieve parity with the
rest of the world.
The parameters that have this sort of influence include the degree of interest rate
smoothing, the degree of habit formation, the pass-through from the exchange rate to
inflation and the elasticity of output with respect to the exchange rate. None of the stan-
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Figure 2.8: Top: Fiscal impact multiplier vs baseline The top figure shows how the
fiscal impact as a percent of GDP varies under different assumptions for the model pa-
rameters. The variations in those parameters are the same as in the previous figure. The
bottom figure shows the sum of output losses in each year as a percent of GDP. Bottom:
Cumulative output loss vs baseline
dard deviation variations of these parameters affects the fiscal impact multiplier by more
than 0.1 ppts in any single year. The sensitivity of inflation to the output gap also has
a relatively small influence on cumulative output losses and the fiscal impact multiplier,
although it does not fall into the same category as the other variables described in this
section.
2.11.3 How much better or worse might it be?
The four parameters which are most important in determining the overall output losses
are the sensitivity of output to interest rates, the sensitivities of interest rates to both
output and inflation and the degree of non-Ricardian behaviour. If these parameters are
independent, unbiased and normally distributed, the likelihood of all four of these pa-
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Figure 2.9: Top: Fiscal impact multiplier vs baseline The top figure shows how the
impact of fiscal policy on the level of GDP - in percent - varies depending on how model
parameters are varied. This figure shows the output of three simulations. A baseline, one
in which parameters are shifted in a way that softens the impact and another in which
the shift deepens the impact. The bottom figure shows the sum of annual losses as a
percentage of GDP. Bottom: Cumulative output loss/gain vs baseline
rameters lying at one end of their respective confidence intervals simultaneously is rather
small. Nonetheless, it is an interesting thought experiment to ask what the output path
might be if they did. Likewise, it is informative to explore the implications for output if
these parameters were to lie at the favourable end of their respective confidence intervals.
The results of this exercise suggest that the cumulative output loss associated with a
one standard deviation shock to each parameter (to the side consistent with output losses)
would be substantial - more than tripling the total cumulative output loss associated with
the consolidation. And the fiscal impact multiplier is also larger, peaking at 0.7 in Year 3,
compared with 0.4 in the baseline scenario. The average multiplier is 0.5 in this scenario
compared with 0.3 in the baseline case. These results are illustrated in Figure 2.9.
A key finding of this study is that a bad outcome is likely to be worse than a good out-
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Figure 2.10: Top: Downside scenario Both figures show the impact of varying model
parameters for the same fiscal tightening as a percentage of GDP Bottom: Upside
scenario
come is to be better, suggesting that risks associated with the consolidation are skewed
to the downside. This finding reflects the underlying distributions of the parameter esti-
mates which are found to be skewed themselves1.
However, the interaction between the increased degree of non-Ricardian behaviour
(which widens the output gap) and the increased persistence of the output gap arising
from variations in the other model parameters means that the cumulative loss of output
is greater than the sum of losses associated with varying each of the model parameters
independently. This is illustrated in Figure 2.10 which shows the contributions to the
wider output gap from independent variations in model parameters and the contribution
of the interaction between them.
1The model itself is linear, but the degree by which the parameters are varied depends on the confidence
intervals of the estimated parameters, which reflect their distributions.
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2.12 Fiscal policy at the zero-lower bound
The central estimate of the average fiscal multiplier associated with a four-year fiscal
consolidation is 0.3, consistent with the findings of Parkyn & Vehbi (2014). The results
of the sensitivity analysis conducted here suggest that the fiscal impact multiplier is likely
to be larger and the cumulative output losses substantially greater if certain model param-
eters differ from the central estimates. But these variations do not cause the estimated
fiscal impact multiplier to reach unity – the peak impact multiplier over the consolidation
period is 0.7 in the downside scenario while the average impact multiplier is 0.5.
Partly, these findings may reflect the choice of priors and so the parameters may
simply not be varied by enough1. However, the results suggest that the functioning of
the economy would have to be greatly different to the model specified here for the fiscal
impact multiplier to be as large as is found by Blanchard & Leigh (2013). Given the
importance of monetary policy in determining the size of the fiscal multiplier, it is useful
to test whether the zero-lower bound of nominal interest rates is able to reconcile the
differences. To that end, I run a simulation in which the nominal interest rate is held fixed
over the period of consolidation and monetary policy is unable to stimulate aggregate
demand.
In this scenario the fiscal impact multiplier is substantially higher, peaking at 0.9,
and averaging 0.7 over the consolidation period. Assuming that the parameter capturing
the degree of non-Ricardian behaviour lies at the unfavourable end of its distribution
increases the peak multiplier to 1.2 and the average multiplier to unity — Figure 2.11.
These estimates are fairly consistent those of Blanchard & Leigh (2013), suggesting that
much of the difference between estimates of the fiscal multiplier in New Zealand relative
to other OECD countries is due to monetary policy constraints.2
2.13 Implications for policy research
The key findings of the research presented here are that uncertainty surrounding the ef-
fects of fiscal consolidations on output can be attributed to several model parameters and
that a bad outcome is likely to be worse than a good outcome is to be better. Overall, the
evidence suggests that policy makers should be sensitive to the prevailing economic en-
vironment when determining the fiscal stance because cumulative output losses can vary
substantially in some situations — particularly when monetary policy is constrained by
the lower bound of nominal interest rates.
1See Leeper et al. (2017) for a discussion of this possibility.
2Note that the assumption that the lower bound binds is consistent with the belief that other measures
taken by central banks to stimulate aggregate demand have had limited positive effects.
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Figure 2.11: Figure shows the impact of fiscal policy tightening in each year of the
simulation as a percentage of GDP under different assumption about whether the lower
bound of interest rates binds.
The responsiveness of aggregate demand to changes in interest rates is a key determi-
nant of the output losses associated with any fiscal consolidation. This is thought to be
related to a structural parameter — the elasticity of intertemporal substitution — which,
in turn, is often considered to be stable and not to fluctuate over the cycle. This is of
particular interest at the current juncture since little is known about how the structural
position of household and corporate balance sheets might affect those agents’ willing-
ness to bring consumption forward in response to lower interest rates. Further work into
the validity of this assumption would improve our understanding of the effects of fiscal
consolidations on the economy.
The degree of monetary activism — how much a central bank might be expected
to move interest rates in response to an announced fiscal consolidation — is also an
important determinant of the effect of consolidations on output. And, in extremis, when
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound of interest rates, the effects of
fiscal tightening are likely to be much larger. The implication is that central banks and
fiscal authorities should coordinate their activities closely if the worst outcomes are to be
avoided.
The degree of non-Ricardian behaviour, which (due to the reduced-form nature of the
model) also includes the effect of trade leakages, is of particular importance. When set-
ting policy governments should consider whether the particular mix of measures is likely
to affect households likely to exhibit more or less Ricardian behaviour. A government
should also consider whether the package it designs is likely to be more or less prone to
leakage, reflecting the import intensity of certain areas of expenditure, for example. This
reduces the uncertainty over this parameter to the extent that the central estimate can be
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thought of as being based on the average effect of a number of packages which differ in
their precise make-up.
A broader question is how this information should shape a government’s policy choices.
In the parallel literature on optimal monetary policy, uncertainty over model parameters
implies an inertial response of interest rates to shocks. The issue for fiscal authorities is
rather more complicated since the benefits of reducing structural budget deficits need to
be balanced against the output losses associated with fiscal consolidations — I leave this
area unexplored but it stands to reason that the asymmetric output losses arising from
parameter uncertainty might incentivise a degree of gradualism in policy setting.
2.14 Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented and estimated a small model of the New Zealand economy.
I then ran a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios and used the results to show the
sensitivity of the fiscal impact multiplier and the associated cumulative output losses to
uncertainty over the model parameters.
The key findings are that uncertainty surrounding the effects of fiscal consolidations
on output can be attributed to several model parameters and that a bad outcome is likely
to be worse than a good outcome is to be better. I find that, if monetary policy were to
be constrained by the zero-lower bound, the estimated fiscal impact multiplier for New
Zealand would be broadly consistent with estimates of the fiscal multiplier in a number
of other OECD countries in that position.
Overall, the evidence suggests that fiscal policy makers should be sensitive to the
prevailing economic environment when determining the fiscal stance and work closely
with central banks if the worst outcomes are to be avoided.
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3
Output Gap Uncertainty in the United
Kingdom: A Fiscal Perspective
3.1 Introduction
In thinking about the sustainability of the public finances, it is important to consider how
the cyclical position of the economy might be affecting revenues and spending. When the
economy is operating below its full capacity, elevated unemployment suppresses income
tax revenues and boosts spending on out-of-work benefits, for example. Likewise, an
overheating economy inflates revenues, since higher wages are needed to tempt more
people into the workforce or encourage them to work more hours, and lowers spending on
some benefits. The most commonly described measure of spare capacity or overheating
is the output gap — the difference between actual output and an estimate of underlying
potential output.
Recognising the role played by these cyclical factors, some governments aim to
achieve balance of a cyclically-adjusted measure of the public finances over a chosen
time horizon. Or, instead, such a gauge is used to decide how much tightening or loosen-
ing is needed to deliver a specific fiscal target some years ahead.
In practice, cyclically adjusting the public finances is not a simple task: first, the
output gap is not directly observable, is inherently uncertain and is prone to substantial
revision; second, even if the cyclical position of the economy could be known with cer-
tainty, the sensitivity of revenues and spending to it would still have to be assessed. This
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paper is concerned with the issue of output gap measurement and uncertainty1.
The paper begins with an analysis of issues surrounding the appropriate definition of
the output gap for the purpose of assessing fiscal sustainability. It goes on to quantify
three sources of output gap uncertainty – data revisions, the arrival of new data and the
use of different models. The paper ends with analysis of the big problems policymakers
face in the use of output gap estimates.
One key conclusion is that governments should choose the method of output gap
estimation that best fits their priors over the processes driving trend growth. Blindly
applying statistical filters, in whatever form, invites repeated and avoidable errors. Even
so, it is also shown that output gap uncertainty is huge and the arrival of new data will
generally prompt big revisions to estimates of the structural deficit.
3.1.1 Conceptual issues
The output gap is the difference between actual output and potential output — the max-
imum level of output that could be achieved while maintaining stable inflation over a
given time horizon. It depends on how many people are available to work and how many
hours they are willing to put in (labour); the number of buildings, machines and comput-
ers that are available to work with (capital); and the efficiency with which they can be
combined (productivity).
3.1.2 Time horizon
In both the academic literature and in public discourse, spare capacity is often viewed
from the perspective of a central bank, rather than that of a fiscal authority. Normally this
is not particularly significant, but there is a distinction between the two that may be more
important when the output gap is large.
In setting borrowing plans over the coming years (five in the UK), fiscal authorities
are interested in how long it might take for spare capacity to be soaked up over a relatively
long time horizon. Central banks, on the other hand are concerned with what resources
can be put to use without stoking inflation over a much shorter period.
In the short-term, for example, lifting output when the long-term unemployment rate
is very high might prompt inflationary pressure if those workers are ill-equipped for the
roles available. The demand for labour might instead be satisfied by encouraging existing
workers to put in more hours by paying them more, creating inflationary pressure.
In time, however, the long-term unemployed might reasonably be expected to re-train
and output could be lifted in a way that does not trigger excess inflation but does lift tax
1The sensitivity of the public finances to the cycle is the subject of Helgadottir et al. (2012)
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receipts and lower benefit spending, improving the fiscal position.
It might be worth considering, then, that measures of spare capacity used by fiscal
policymakers should differ from those at central banks. A failure to understand that it
might take longer for the public finances to recover than for inflationary pressure to build
could prompt policymakers to overestimate the size of the structural deficit. That could
lead to excessive fiscal tightening and slower economic recoveries, particularly when
monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
Many measures of the output gap with a monetary policy emphasis, applied in the
academic literature, can be adjusted to take account of this difference in perspective. For
example, bottom-up estimates of potential output, such as those derived using a produc-
tion function, require explicit judgements over the equilibrium rate of unemployment,
trend hours worked and activity. And judgements surrounding smoothing parameters,
for example, can be adjusted when using statistical filters to produce top-down estimates.
In what follows, the methods of output gap estimation are consistent with being from
the perspective of the fiscal authority rather than the central bank.
3.1.3 Uncertainty
The output gap cannot be measured directly or known with certainty, even with the benefit
of hindsight. Revisions to estimates of the output gap can, therefore, be significant. They
come from three sources:
• end-point uncertainty arises because the future path of output is unknown and it
may contain information about the cyclical position of the economy now. This
matters more for some estimation methods than others, largely reflecting the as-
sumptions that underpin them and the extent to which information from the future
is used to inform current estimates of the output gap;
• data uncertainty arises because the information available at the time is not the final
vintage of that data. It may become more accurate with time as more information
from that time period becomes available and measurement methods improve. Some
methods are more sensitive to this than others, dependent on the degree to which
revisions are attributed to the level of potential output or the output gap; and
• model uncertainty reflects mainly changes to our understanding of how the econ-
omy functions. Generally, methods with a richer economic structure would be
more susceptible to this source of uncertainty but, as our understanding of the pro-
cess governing the growth of productivity evolves, for example, so might our view
on the volatility of potential output — which would affect the estimates from all
the methods presented in what follows.
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Uncertainty matters because it could be relevant to policy. It has long been con-
sidered, Brainard (1967) that uncertainty over the way the functioning of the economy
functions could affect the way in which monetary policy is set. That same principle must
surely be relevant to fiscal policy as well.
The susceptibility of output gap estimates to different sources of revision is examined
throughout this paper. The effect of new data is assessed by comparing the real-time and
ex-post estimates for a variety of the methods presented; the influence of revisions to
data is assessed by comparing output gap estimates using current and real-time vintages
of the data, while model uncertainty is reflected in the wide range of output gap estimates
produced using different methods.
3.1.4 Assessing performance
Since the potential output of the economy cannot be measured directly, we will never
know whether the estimates we construct are accurate. This makes it difficult to assess
the benefits of one method of estimation over another. Ideally, we would like a measure
that can be calculated accurately in real time (i.e. is not revised much) and appears plau-
sible with hindsight. It is tempting to rank output gap measures only on their tendency to
be revised as the benefit of hindsight informs past estimates. However, it would be easy
to win this competition using a method that sets actual output equal to potential output at
all times and is never revised. Unfortunately, such a method would be useless for fore-
casting, since, among other things, it would implicitly assume that the unemployed never
return to work. So we need to look beyond just tendency for revision when assessing the
performance of measures.
For central banks, estimates of the output gap can be assessed based on their perfor-
mance in explaining that element of inflation thought to depend on demand pressures.
For fiscal authorities (and fiscal watchdogs), a sensible metric might be the extent to
which the output gap explains cyclical variations in the public finances. But there is an
obvious circularity here — how do we know the cyclical parts of inflation and the fiscal
balance without already having an estimate of the cycle? Insofar as the estimated output
gaps that best explain inflation are likely to have been estimated using the Phillips curve,
for example, then they will be ranked (possibly undeservedly) top.
Policymakers typically consider a wide range of evidence when forming a view on
the margin of spare capacity in the economy, supported by a narrative that reflects their
subjective interpretation of economic developments. An alternative approach to quantita-
tively evaluating various output gap measures (and having to place a weight on tendency
to revision relative to theoretical coherence) is to ask whether they are consistent with
our broader understanding of economic history. Clearly, a method indicating significant
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overheating during the Great Depression might have been a rather unhelpful guide to
subsequent economic prospects.
3.2 Univariate Methods
Univariate methods are those that utilise just the output series itself. In what follows,
real, non-oil, gross value added per capita is chosen as the measure of actual output.1
The motivation for this is that the size of the working-age population is unlikely to be
closely related to the cyclical position of the economy. Scaling by the population pre-
vents demographic trends from introducing noise to the estimated output gaps. The oil
sector is also excluded, since it accounts for a tiny percentage of employment but a more
significant share of output — oil output is very volatile because it is affected by main-
tenance procedures, for example. In what follows, the logs of actual output, potential
output and the output gap are given by yt, y∗tt and ct respectively and are related by the
identity presented in Equation 1.
yt = y
∗t
t + ct (3.1)
3.2.1 Linear de-trending
The simplest method for estimating the path of potential output is to assume it is a straight
line. More complicated is deciding the dates between which it should be drawn. Fig-
ure 3.1 show the estimates of the output gap associated with drawing a straight line from
the first quarter of 1965 and measuring deviations of actual output from it.
The first figure plots estimates of the output gap in real time and ex-post — where
real time means using only data up to the quarter in question and ex-post estimates make
use of the whole sample. The revisions are shown to be very large — this is because, as
time passes, more is known about the historical rate of growth and the slope of the line
is updated accordingly Figure 3.2. Towards the end of the sample, the ex-post estimates
(made using the full sample) converge with the real-time estimates of the output gap. This
method is relatively sensitive to the chosen starting point — shifting it 5 years forward,
for example, reduces the size of the output gap in the final quarter of 2013 from -6.4 per
cent to -6.0 per cent.
1Where the population is defined as those aged 16 years or over, as recorded by the Labour Force
Survey (LFS). Prior to the LFS (which began in 1971), annual total population figures are used, available
from the ONS, interpolated to a quarterly frequency and spliced to the later data.
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Figure 3.1: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent
of GDP using the linear de-trending method.
Figure 3.2: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential
GDP growth using the linear de-trending method.
3.2.2 Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
The HP filter — Hodrick & Prescott (1997) — is based on two beliefs:
• output does not deviate too far from its trend level (cycles are not too big); and











(∆y∗t+1 − y∗t )2) (3.2)
The filter chooses y∗tt such that loss function (2) is minimised, where σ
2
1 is the variance
of the output gap and σ22 is the variance of trend growth. The user of the HP filter can
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specify the relative weight placed on the two beliefs by constraining the ratio of the two





It is clear from Equation 2 that penalising the smoothness of potential output is the
same as minimising the sum of squared residuals from the equation:
∆y∗t+1 = ∆y
∗
t + 2,t+1 (3.4)
And, in minimising the sum of squared deviations of actual output from trend output,
we are minimising the sum of squared residuals from the equation:
ct = 1, t. (3.5)
The HP filter can also be represented in state-space - the signal equation is given by
the identity presented in Equation 1, the state equation for potential output is given by
Equation 7 (a manipulation of Equation 4) and the state equation for the output gap is
given by Equation 8:
Signal :yt = y
∗
t + ct (3.6)
State :y∗t+1 = 2y
∗




State :ct = 1, t (3.8)
The lambda term has been applied such that the error terms are constrained by the rel-
ative weight placed on output gap minimisation and potential output growth smoothness.
The state-space representation of the HP filter can be solved using the Kalman algorithm,
which provides one-sided and two-sided estimates of the output gap (i.e. real-time and
ex-post estimates) — Kalman (1960).
The value represented by the choice of lambda is the only explicit judgement asso-
ciated with the HP filter and is one subject to significant debate in the literature. The
authors, Hodrick and Prescott, posit that a value of 1600 is appropriate for quarterly data
reflecting the view that this tallies with their subjective assessment of the US business
cycle. Pedersen (2001), for example, argues that a value of 1000 is better. Of course,
there is no reason why the UK business cycle must be characterised by the same degree
of persistence as in the US or that the business cycles today should typically be of the
same length as in the past. And the appropriate value of lambda (which determines the
stiffness of the filter) will vary with the time-horizon of the output gap being measured.
While it is the choice of lambda that often gets the most attention, the HP filter is also
consistent with a number of other implicit assumptions and judgements:
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• the data-generating process governing the evolution of potential output is assumed
to be a random walk with stochastic drift;
• from the above, the best indicator of tomorrow’s potential output growth is today’s
potential output growth;
• the output gap is an independent and identically distributed random variable, so the
best guess of tomorrow’s output gap, given today’s output gap, is zero (no expected
persistence);1 and
• shocks to demand are not correlated with shocks to supply.
A number of these implicit judgements are important. Of particular significance, and
not too well understood by most practitioners is that trend growth is assumed to vary at
random rather than tend towards a specific value. This distinction sounds arcane but it
extremely important - it materially affects the end-point properties of the filter. Hamilton
(2017) goes as far as to suggest the HP filter should never be used.
The assumption that demand shocks are uncorrelated with supply is also contentious,
since it rules out the possibility of periods of protracted cyclical weakness permanently
lowering the level of output. DeLong et al. (2012), for example, take a different view —
they posit that a large negative output gap can have very persistent effects on the level
of potential output, via hysteresis effects in the labour market or reduced investment
lowering the capital stock, for example. The IMF IMF (2012a), in its advice to the UK
government, used an estimate that a negative output gap of 1 per cent might lower the
level of potential output by around 0.1 per cent a year and found that much of the effect
in the UK is accounted for by labour market hysteresis.
The way in which hysteresis effects influence estimates of the output gap depends on
the time horizon of the output gap measure in question. For example, hysteresis effects
in the labour market will tend to push up the rate of unemployment consistent with stable
inflation in the medium term, but may affect the long-term structural rate by less. So
estimates of the output gap on a medium-term basis would be likely to report less slack
in the economy than those aiming to capture a longer-term measure of spare capacity.
Hysteresis effects are also important to forecasts of potential output, although that is not
the subject of this paper.
At the end of the sample, there are no future data available to assist with estimating
the current level of potential output — the so-called end-point problem. All two-sided
filters suffer from this problem and are revised once future data become available. Filters
1In practice, persistence of the output gap is introduced via the smoothing parameter - similar results
could be obtained by instead assuming the output gap is an autoregressive process and calibrating the
parameters of that equation.
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Figure 3.3: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent
of GDP using the HP filter.
Figure 3.4: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential
GDP growth using the HP filter.
respond differently to the end-point problem depending on the assumptions that underpin
them. The specific assumptions underpinning the HP filter mean that, at the end of the
sample, potential output growth tends to be biased down when the output gap is nega-
tive and biased up when it is positive. It is shown later that other filters may respond
differently, but do not necessarily offer a more favourable balance of characteristics.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the HP filter estimates of the output gap (with lambda set to
1600) in both real-time and ex-post. Perhaps the most striking thing about this figure is
that revisions tend to be largest around recessions and particularly over the most recent
recession. In 2007, this measure would have said the economy was operating at around
its trend level of output. It now says the economy was overheating by around 4 per cent
of potential GDP — and that potential output growth began to slow in the early 2000s.
This specific reinterpretation reflects the loss function of the filter — because sharp
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movements in potential output growth are heavily penalised, the two-sided filter begins
the slowdown ahead of the recession, to avoid making a very large adjustment when
the crisis hits. The one-sided (real-time) version of the filter cannot see this coming so
is forced to allocate the shocks to potential growth and the output gap as they become
apparent. It is worth considering that the assumptions underpinning the HP filter are
consistent with a specific view of the process governing potential output.
The average revision associated with the HP filter over the time period selected is
around 1.4 percentage points (a little larger than its average absolute size of 1.1 per cent).
The latest estimate of the output gap provided by the HP filter (i.e. those for the final
quarter of 2013) do not change materially when the sample start point is shifted forward
five years.
The distribution of actual output is consistent with booms gathering pace gradually
but recessions being more abrupt. This real-time asymmetry can partly be ameliorated by
placing more weight on estimates of past potential growth than the HP filter does, which
can be achieved by altering the objective function of the filter.
3.2.3 Prior-constrained (PC) filter
Like the HP filter, the prior-constrained (PC) filter1 is based on two beliefs — the first is
the same but the second differs:
• output does not deviate too far from its trend level (cycles are not too big); and
• the growth rate of potential output does not differ too much from its historical










(∆y∗t+1 − driftt)2) (3.9)
The PC filter chooses y∗tt such that the loss function given by Equation is minimised.
σ21 is the variance of the output gap and σ
2
2 is the variance of trend growth deviations
from its historical rate of drift. Like the HP filter, the user of the PC filter can specify
the relative weight placed on the two beliefs by constraining the ratio of the two variance





The parameter k is set to 625 in what follows — as a rough guide, this setting implies
that shocks to the output gap are around five times as large as those to the level of potential
1The PC filter is applied by Benes & N’Diaye (2004) and Laxton & Tetlow (1992), for example.
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output. The PC filter is estimated in state-space using the Kalman algorithm. To assist
this algorithm in its search, it is helpful to set starting values for the unobserved states —
these are set to be consistent with the output gap being closed at the start of the sample.
In practice, this only affects estimates of the output gap very early in the real-time sample
— both the real-time estimates at the end of the sample and the ex-post estimates across
the whole sample are not sensitive to the choice of initial conditions.
The state-space representation of the PC filter is given by Equations 11 to 14.
Signal :yt = y
∗
t + ct (3.11)
State :y∗t+1 = y
∗




State :driftt = driftt−1 (3.13)
State :ct = 1, t (3.14)
As with the HP filter, the smoothing parameter,k, is important, but the PC filter is also
consistent with a number of other implicit assumptions and judgements:
• the data-generating process governing the evolution of potential output is assumed
to be a random walk with constant drift;
• from the above, the best guess of tomorrow’s potential output growth is the histor-
ical rate of drift;1
• the output gap is an independent and identically distributed random variable, so the
best guess of tomorrow’s output gap, given today’s output gap, is zero (no expected
persistence); and
• shocks to demand are not correlated with shocks to supply.
The assumptions outlined above are similar in nature to those of the HP filter, with the
main difference being that the HP filter is consistent with stochastic drift (shocks occur
both to the level of potential output and its underlying growth rate) while the PC filter is
consistent with constant drift (shocks occur only to the level of potential output, not its
growth rate). In principle, any prior over the drift term can be incorporated, including
structural breaks to the growth of potential GDP.2 The remaining assumptions are subject
to the same criticisms as described in the HP section.
1The one-sided filter calculates the historical average rate of drift up to the current time period and
updates this as it moves forward. The two-sided filter makes an estimate of the drift term over the whole
sample.
2Incorporating a structural break during the recent financial crisis does not affect the output gap es-
timate, rather it changes the path of supply shocks. So this judgement is more important for forecasting
potential GDP than it is for estimating the output gap.
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Figure 3.5: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent
of GDP using the prior-constrained filter.
With an appropriate choice of scaling parameter, the PC filter gives identical two-
sided (ex-post) estimates of the output gap to those provided by the HP filter but it pro-
vides different real-time estimates (at the end of the sample). Both filters choose potential
output such that their loss functions are minimised. The HP filter is based on a more flex-
ible assumption for the dynamics of potential output than is the PC filter. So minimising
the first part of its objective function (closing the output gap) is easier, because it is less
costly to do so by adjusting its estimates of potential output growth.
It is important to recognise that the assumptions underpinning different filters signif-
icantly affect their real-time properties. The HP filter is far more likely to signal a closed
output gap at the end of the sample and be revised subsequently than is the PC filter — a
feature thought by many to be undesirable. But, by placing more weight on past growth
as a guide to future growth, the PC filter is slower to respond should there be structural
breaks in the growth rate of potential output, and subsequently be revised for this reason
— again, an undesirable property. Because of this, the real-time estimates of different
filters might be more reliable at different times and care should be taken to consider other
evidence.
Like the HP filter, the PC filter penalises volatility of trend growth so revisions to its
output gap estimates, with the benefit of hindsight, imply more overheating in the econ-
omy before the recent financial crisis and slower trend growth in the years that preceded
it. The key distinction between the real-time HP and PC filters is that the latter is more
likely to interpret growth rates above the historical average as being unsustainable in real
time than would the former. With the benefit of hindsight, the PC filter estimates are very
close to those of the HP filter.
Starting the sample later has a small effect on an estimate of the output gap now -
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Figure 3.6: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential
GDP growth using the prior-constrained filter.
shifting the sample on five years alters the current output gap estimate by 0.1 percentage
points, for example. Largely this is because the filter uses estimates of historical trend
growth to inform its estimates, which is affected by the choice of sample period.
3.2.4 Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition
The trend-cycle decomposition of Beveridge & Nelson (1981) presents output as an au-
toregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) process. They postulate that the per-
manent component of the series is equal to the long-run forecast of output, taking into
account its mean rate of change — which identifies the trend and cycle components of
output.
The BN decomposition depends upon a number of assumptions:
• output growth is stationary;
• the trend is equal to the long-run forecast of the series;
• both trend and cycle are affected only by a common shock; and
• the ARIMA specification is correct.
The most important assumption is that all movements in the trend and cycle com-
ponents of output are driven by a common (unidentified) shock. The shock to potential
output is assumed to be negatively correlated with the cyclical shock — when the shock
pushes potential output up, it pushes aggregate demand down. This is a fairly restrictive
assumption but one possibility is that the shock could be accounted for by movements in
productivity — an interpretation which could be consistent with a ‘real business cycle’
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view of the world.1 The results are also sensitive to the specification of the ARIMA model
- Canova (1998) shows that the inclusion of more or fewer lags can greatly influence the
resultant output gap estimates.
I estimate the output gap using an ARIMA (2,1,0) specification and the estimates are
presented in Figure 3.11. The combination of assumptions described above gives an out-
put gap that is generally of smaller amplitude than its comparators, while the Beveridge-
Nelson estimates of potential output are more volatile than actual output.
3.2.5 Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filter
The Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) filter is a band-pass filter, formulated in the frequency
domain. It works by filtering out data according to its frequency, decomposing a time
series into trend, cycle and noise. In what follows, anything with a frequency below two
years is considered noise, between 2 and 8 years is cycle and over 8 years is trend. This
is a typical convention, but, like the HP filter, there is no strong evidence to bring to bear
on the choice of cut-offs, so this choice is a judgement.
The CF filter makes use of the entire sample to estimate the cycle and is subject to the
same end-point problem as the other filters — the absence of future data makes it prone
to revision. However, Nilsson & Gyomai (2011) find that the CF filter revisions tend to
be a little smaller than those for the HP filter. The cost, though, is that it is less likely than
the HP filter to pick up signals of turning points. They judge that the HP filter is more
appropriate to the OECD’s short-term forecasting needs than is the CF filter.
Furthermore, Estrella (2007) compares the performance of a range of univariate filters
and finds that the HP filter performs best but, crucially, only in cases when its assumptions
are consistent with the true process being examined. As with the BN decomposition,
because the CF filter has no state-space representation, real-time gap estimates are not
presented, but the ex-post estimates are included in comparison Figure 3.11.
3.2.6 Hamilton filter
The HP filter depends on very restrictive assumptions about the underlying data gen-
erating process for trend output and the cycle. Yet the Hamilton filter also embodies
assumption which may not match the process driving GDP either. Hamilton (2017) il-
lustrates this fact and shows that the HP filter is ill-suited to the wide range of problems
to which it is often applied by practitioners of econometrics. A better solution, Hamilton
says, is to use a simple regression model to separate trend from cycle. The logic being
1See Kydland & Prescott (1982) for a description of real business cycle theory.
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Figure 3.7: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of the output gap as a per-
cent of GDP using the Hamilton filter. Real time estimates are produced with a rolling
regression, ex-post estimates make use of the full sample
that the difference between the realised values and forecasts for the variable in question
should be a good proxy for cyclical deviations.
Hamilton proposes estimating a regression model of the following specification for
quarterly data:
yt = c+ β1yt−8 + β2yt−9 + β3yt−10 + β4yt−11 + t (3.15)
Where the difference between the predicted value of output less the actual value is the
cyclical component of the series being detrended. This specification may address some
of the problems of using the HP filter and perhaps it is the best method for application to
a wide range of problems - I cannot say. But when it comes to estimating the output gap
in the United Kingdom, it doesn’t seem to offer huge advantages over other methods.
Implicitly, the trend rate of growth is determined by the estimates of the coefficients
on lagged output and the constant. Implicitly, then, it is assumed when applying this
filter that trend growth in the future will be the same as that estimated on average over
the past. That differs to the HP filter but it is fairly similar to the assumptions embodied
in the specification of the PC filter.
Because the estimated parameters will vary as new data arrive, this means the Hamil-
ton filter estimates are also subject to revision. As Figure 3.7 shows, the output gap
revisions are material when applying the Hamilton filter. Crucially, on the eve of the
financial crisis, the Hamilton filter would have said that the economy was running with a
margin of slack, while later vintages would instead indicate some overheating - the same
as would have been recorded by the HP and PC filters.
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Figure 3.8: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential
GDP growth using the Hamilton filter.
Figure 3.9: Figure compares real-time output gap estimates made by the HP, PC and H
filters - percent of GDP
3.2.7 Comparison of univariate methods
The three univariate filters estimated in real time are the HP, PC and Hamilton methods,
illustrated in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10. It is clear to see that potential growth is anchored
more closely to the historical average using the PC filter than with the HP filter, though
the broad pictures painted by both are similar. Potential growth is substantially more
volatile when estimated using the Hamilton filter.
The resulting output gap series illustrate the specific point that the HP filter assump-
tions lead to bias at the very end of the sample. The very large negative output gap serves
to bias down potential growth and so the HP filter persistently estimates a rapidly closing
or even positive output gap at the end of the sample — most obvious during the present
recovery period. Again the Hamilton filter produces an estimated output gap of bigger
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Figure 3.10: Figure compares real-time potential growth estimates made by the HP, PC
and H filters
Figure 3.11: Figure compares ex-post output gap estimates made by the HP, PC, H, BN,
and CF filters - percent of GDP
amplitude during the last recession in the sample.
Crucially, on the eve of the financial crisis the Hamilton filter would have said that the
economy was running with a margin of slack, while later vintages would instead indicate
some overheating - the same as would have been recorded by the HP and PC filters.
In other words, whether the Hamilton, HP or PC filter had been deployed in mid-2008,
policymakers would not have drawn vastly different conclusions.
The ex-post estimates of the output gap and potential growth include the BN decom-
position and CF filter — presented in Figure 3.11 and Figure Figure 3.12. Most striking
is how the different assumptions lead to such a wide range of estimates. Clearly, the BN
decomposition is a different class of model altogether, consistent with significant poten-
tial output volatility (more so even than actual output). The Hamilton filter also produces
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Figure 3.12: Figure compares ex-post potential growth rate estimates made by the HP,
PC, H BN and CF filters.
very volatile estimates.
The PC and HP filters present similar estimates (except at the end of the sample, when
the ex-post estimates converge with the real-time estimates). The CF filter is consistent
with a smoother output gap series but more volatile potential output (since the volatility
of actual output — the noise identified by the filter — must be assigned somewhere),
although a different set of cycle-length assumption would give a different set of estimates.
In summary, the results show that estimates of the output gap obtained using univari-
ate filters are very sensitive to the assumptions underpinning them. As Estrella (2007)
notes, filters must be carefully selected for any particular application and it seems likely
that no single method would accommodate all circumstances well.
3.3 Multivariate methods
This section covers a number of methods which make use of more than one variable.
It starts by setting out a suite of models based on the multivariate PC filter, which is
adapted from the multivariate HP filter presented in Laxton & Tetlow (1992). It then
presents alternative methods including principal components and an aggregate composite
of survey indicators.
Ultimately, the univariate filters set out in the previous section rely on judgement
over the amplitude of the cycle and strong priors over the dynamics of potential output.
To refine those judgements, we need more information. Often, though, taking on more
information requires explicit assumptions over how it should influence estimates of the
output gap, as is shown below.
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3.3.1 The multivariate PC filter
The standard multivariate filter, presented by Laxton & Tetlow, augments the objective
function of the HP filter with the sum of squared residuals from another signal relation-
ship. In what follows, the same approach is taken but the PC filter is used instead, to avoid
the specific type of end-point bias associated with the HP filter. The objective function of
the filter (15), therefore, looks much like (9), but also includes the sum of squared resid-
uals, , from a relationship that includes the output gap - that is, the filter also chooses the














And so, the multivariate PC filter is based on three beliefs, the first two of which are
common to the standard PC filter:
• output does not deviate too far from its trend level (cycles are not too big);
• the growth rate of potential output does not differ too much from its historical
average rate of drift; and
• other indicators, for example unemployment, tell us something about the cyclical
position of the economy.
While taking on information from other sources is likely to ameliorate, to some ex-
tent, the end-point problem, judgements are still required. Instead of one smoothing
parameter to choose, there are now two. These are used to decide, first, the variability of
potential output and, second, how much weight to place on the structural relationship of
choice. In practice, this allows us to select a smoothness of potential output that is con-
sistent with the time horizon appropriate for use by a fiscal authority. But it also allows
us to make use of other information, which might be more relevant to a medium-term










While the scaling parameter in Equation 16 sets the variability of potential output
relative to the sum of squared residuals of the output gap equation, the weight placed on
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other information, the specification and the fit of the structural equation of choice will
also influence the overall cyclicality of the estimated output gap series. So, in what fol-
lows, the cyclicality of the resultant series is inspected relative to the baseline case and
any major differences reported. The variability of potential output is tied down judge-
mentally by setting k.
The weight placed on information from the structural relationship is determined by
the size of ψ relative to k. As a baseline case, ψ and k are set equal to one another.
Alternatively, judgement about how much weight to place on other information can be
applied by adjusting the second parameter, given by Equation 17.
In what follows, the PC is augmented filter by one of three possible relationships,1:
• a Phillips curve;
• a version of Okun’s law; and
• a capacity utilisation equation.
3.3.2 Philips curve-augmented PC filter
Inflation could contain useful information about slack in both the labour and product
markets. First, tightness in the labour market could see the pass-through of higher wage
demands to prices. Second, excess demand in the product market could affect firms’
mark-up decisions. To make use of this information, the model presented below includes
a reduced-form version of a structural relationship between inflation and spare capacity
in the economy, known as the New Keynesian Phillips curve — similar to that presented
in Gali & Monacelli (2005) and presented in Equation 18:
pit = β1pi
e
t+1 + (1− β1)pit−1 + β2ct−1 + 3,t. (3.19)
pit is the deviation of inflation from its steady state rate, piet+1 is the expected deviation
one period ahead and pit−1 is lagged inflation. This formulation introduces persistence
to the inflation process, such that it better matches the observed data. The neutrality
of money is preserved by constraining the sum of the coefficients on future and lagged
inflation to unity. The influence of the cycle, ct−1, is captured by the coefficient β2. In
this model, inflation expectations are anchored to the steady state inflation rate, so the
expected deviation of inflation from steady-state is zero (i.e. piet+1 = 0 in equation 3.19).
The chosen measure of inflation is CPI inflation, adjusted for the estimated effects of
VAT measures (which are not directly related to the cycle) and the influence of food and
1In some ways, this method is similar to the MV method presented in Benesˇ et al. (2010) although here
the model parameters are calibrated and weight is placed on the information, rather than using Bayesian
methods to restrict the parameter space and specify priors over shocks to the measurement equations.
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Figure 3.13: Figure shows real-time estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and Phillips-augmented filter.
oil costs, which are volatile and exogenous. The model parameters are calibrated in line
with Murray (2012).
The steady state inflation rate is derived by applying the PC filter to the inflation series
and the data-generating process is assumed to be a random walk without drift (the drift
term is assumed to be zero in the objective function of the filter). Real-time estimates
of the output gap use real-time estimates of steady-state inflation and likewise ex-post
estimates are based on the ex-post steady-state estimate. The state-space model is given
by Equations 19 to 23.
Signal :yt = y
∗
t + ct (3.20)





State :y∗t+1 = y
∗




State :driftt = driftt−1 (3.23)
State :ct = 1, t (3.24)
The real-time and ex-post output gap series estimated using the Phillips curve to
inform the judgement are compared with those of the standard PC filter in Figure 3.13
and Figure 3.14. The real-time estimates illustrate the uncertainty associated with real-
time estimates of the trend inflation rate and, to some extent, the challenge of removing
exogenous shocks from the series — particularly oil price shocks in the 1970s. The
ex-post estimates look more sensible, since the trend inflation rate is known with more
certainty over the difficult periods.
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Figure 3.14: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and Phillips-augmented filter.
Figure 3.15: Figure shows real-time estimates of the year-over-year potential growth
rate using the prior-constrained and Phillips-augmented filter.
When inflation is taken into account, the late-1980s boom looks a bit smaller than
the PC filter implies ex-post. The low and stable inflation environment from the late
1990s serves to anchor the Phillips estimates of the output gap close to zero, but the
inclusion of inflation tells us little about the output gap over that period on an ex-post
basis. Overall, the ex-post estimates from the Phillips curve are relatively close to those
of the basic PC filter, but the weakness of inflation before the last crisis and absence of
strong disinflationary pressure afterwards tends to reduce both the estimated size of the
boom and bust.
The additional information from inflation tends to increase the volatility of trend
growth, relative to the estimates provided by the basic filter. This is because less weight
is placed on minimising deviations from the historical rate of growth, in order to take on
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Figure 3.16: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the year-over-year potential growth rate
using the prior-constrained and Phillips-augmented filter.
information from inflation. In extremis, a weight could be chosen that would make the
output gap look exactly like the inflation deviation from steady-state and the potential
growth rates would be much more volatile to reflect this.
The real-time estimates provided by this method are probably only reliable towards
the end of the sample, when the monetary policy regime became more settled. The ex-
post estimates are useful insofar as they help to incorporate information from inflation
into estimates of the output gap while broadly preserving the features of the cycle. But
incorporating such information requires a number of assumptions and implicit judge-
ments, including but not limited to:
• the hypothesised Phillips relation being correctly specified;
• the calibrated coefficients of the Phillips curve being correct;
• stability of the relationship over time;
• the filter-based estimate of steady-state inflation being accurate; and
• the prior weight placed on its information content being appropriate.
These assumptions are highly uncertain - there is ongoing contention over how the
Phillips curve should be specified - see Rudd & Whelan (2007) for example. The co-
efficients are poorly identified and circularity is introduced because they are typically
estimated using output gap estimates. The relationship may not be stable over time -
see Iakova (2007) for evidence on the flattening of the Phillips curve. The steady-state
is estimated using a relatively stiff filter but there have been significant changes to the
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monetary policy framework over the sample period. And finally, given the uncertainties,
it is unclear how much weight should be placed on the Phillips curve.
Neither changing the starting values nor shifting the sample on five years make a
material difference to the estimates of the gap at the end of the sample period. Partly,
the small difference reflects the fact that the key parameters are calibrated rather than
estimated so model uncertainty does not have an influence when the sample is changed.
The average output gap revision is around 2.6 percentage points, which is very large, but
this largely reflects uncertainty over the trend rate of inflation. By selecting a sample over
which the monetary policy framework was stable (1995 onwards, for example), this falls
to 0.8 percentage points.
3.3.3 Okun’s law augmented PC filter
To take account of slack in the labour market, we can make use of another relationship —
that between cyclical unemployment and the output gap. This simple relationship is set
out in Okun (1963) and a version of it is presented in Equation (24), where is the cyclical
deviation of unemployment from its natural rate and ε4,t is an i.i.d shock:
uct = β3ct + 4,t. (3.25)
To ensure consistency across the various measures presented that use the unemploy-
ment gap as an indicator, the real-time and ex-post estimates of the structural rate (the
NAWRU) are produced using a common methodology, described in the Annex. These
measures of the NAWRU are used to inform the estimate of the output gap. Like the
Phillips model, the Okun relationship is added to the state-space model of the PC filter
by introducing the following signal equation:






Figures 14 and 15 compare output gap estimates from the Okun-augmented PC filter
with those from the basic PC filter. The Okun filter sees more slack in the late 1970s and
early 1980s than does the PC filter, which accords with elevated unemployment over that
period and ultimately, the ex-post estimates from the PC filter are revised closer to the
Okun estimates. The late 1980s boom appears to be more pronounced in real-time, using
the Okun filter and, again, the PC filter shows a sharper boom at the end of the 1980s
ex-post.
Making use of the Okun relationship, the elevated rate of unemployment widens the
estimated output gap in the period since the recent recession and makes the boom that
preceded it look small. Overall, the results suggest that it is important to recognise such
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Figure 3.17: Figure shows real-time estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and Okun-augmented filter.
Figure 3.18: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and Okun-augmented filter.
an obvious source of spare capacity in the economy when forming a view of the output
gap.
But, as with the Phillips relation, it is important to remember that the estimates depend
heavily on a number of assumptions:
• the hypothesised Okun relation being correctly specified;
• the estimated coefficients of the Okun relation being correct;
• stability of the relationship over time; and
• the filter-based estimate of the NAWRU being accurate.
Again, these assumptions are highly uncertain. The Okun relation has various spec-
ifications and, while the coefficient of -0.5 is estimated over the whole sample period,
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Figure 3.19: Figure shows real-time estimates of the year-over-year potential growth
rate using the prior-constrained and Okun-augmented filter.
there is evidence to suggest that it may vary — the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s
were associated with far larger increases in unemployment than was the latest recession.
If the Okun coefficient were now lower, then the estimated output gap would be biased
in a way that made it appear larger.
Moving the sample on five years has a small effect on the estimates of the current
output gap (a bit less than 0.1 percentage points), while the estimates of the output gap
are revised, on average, by around 1.3 percentage points — a bit less than the average
magnitude of the output gap (around 1.7 per cent).
3.3.4 Capacity utilisation-augmented PC filter
The third augmentation relies on a posited, non-structural relationship between capacity
utilisation indicators and the output gap. This is intended to capture slack within firms.
capct = β4ct + 5,t (3.27)
This time, the signal equation is given by,






The capacity utilisation data are sourced from the Confederation of British Industry
(CBI) and pertain to manufacturers only — services firms, which account for the bulk of
activity, have not been surveyed over the long time series available for the manufacturing
sector.1 For simplicity, the weight placed on the equation in explaining the output gap is
set equal to the smoothing parameter, as with the Phillips and Okun filters.
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Figure 3.20: Figure shows rex-post estimates of the year-over-year potential growth rate
using the prior-constrained and Okun-augmented filter.
Figure 3.21: Figure shows real-time estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and capacity utilisation-augmented filter.
The inclusion of capacity utilisation serves to make the 1980s boom appear larger
than it does in the basic PC filter. And, because capacity utilisation was close to usual
levels before the latest recession, it makes the positive output gap smaller. It also points to
the economy operating significantly above trend from 2010 onwards. Again, this model
depends on a number of non-trivial judgements and assumptions:
• the hypothesised capacity utilisation relation being correctly specified;
• the freely-estimated coefficient being correct;
• stability of the relationship over time; and
1As with the other methods, the capacity utilisation data have been pre-filtered to extract trend and
cycle - both in real time and ex post.
3.3. MULTIVARIATE METHODS 72
Figure 3.22: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and capacity utilisation-augmented filter.
Figure 3.23: Figure shows real-time estimates of the year-over-year potential growth
rate using the prior-constrained and capacity utilisation-augmented filter.
• the steady-state survey balance being correctly estimated.
Again, these assumptions are highly uncertain — there is no structural link between
survey balances and the output gap, rather it should be treated as an indicator. It is also
difficult to know exactly how respondents interpret the survey question. When asked,
they may be thinking of a very short-term notion of spare capacity and ignore mothballed
capacity that could be brought back online in the medium term. This may lead to biases
in the short term that later unwind, but these would not be captured in the methodol-
ogy described above. Furthermore, the survey captures the number of firms operating
below/above capacity, rather than the extent to which firms are operating above/below
capacity — the latter is what is relevant to output gap estimation.
Shifting the sample start date forwards by five years has a small effect on the size of
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Figure 3.24: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the year-over-year potential growth rate
using the prior-constrained and capacity utilisation-augmented filter.
the output gap estimate for the final quarter of 2013 — around 0.1 percentage points. The
revisions are small because the capacity utilisation data are not revised and abstract from
uncertainty over the steady state values.
3.3.5 Multivariate filter model
The final incarnation of the PC filter in this paper takes information from all three of the
output gap relationships described above and forms a multivariate filter that is includes
the following signal equations:

















The parameter governing the volatility of potential output, k, is set to 625 but there
are now three other parameters to select based on the weight placed on them in explaining
the output gap. The weights chosen here are all equal — setting the parameters ψpi, ψcap
and ψu to 625.
Figures Figure 3.25 and Figure 3.26 illustrate the effect of including additional infor-
mation from hypothesised relationships between the output gap and inflation, unemploy-
ment and capacity utilisation. The weight placed on additional information in forming a
view on the output gap serves to reduce the end-point problem of the filter, insofar as the
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Figure 3.25: Figure shows real-time estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and multivariate filter.
Figure 3.26: Figure shows real-time estimates of the year-over-year potential growth
rate using the prior-constrained and multivariate filter.
MV model places less weight on GDP data from the future and so is less susceptible to
revision when it comes to bear.
The most notable difference between the MV and PC estimates is that the size of the
pre-crisis boom looks substantially smaller, because much of the data used to augment
the filter were consistent with output being close to trend. The information does suggest,
however, that output was further above trend in the late 1980s and the late 1990s than the
basic filter would suggest.
Potential growth is somewhat more volatile using the MV filter, because less weight is
placed on preserving its smoothness once other data are taken into account. In principle,
a higher weight could be placed on minimising the deviation of potential growth from
trend and this would serve to make the MV filter estimate closer to the PC estimate.
Ultimately it is a matter of judgement as to how volatile potential output should be, since
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Figure 3.27: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent of GDP
using the prior-constrained and multivariate filter.
Figure 3.28: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the year-over-year potential growth rate
using the prior-constrained and multivariate filter.
it cannot be observed.
While the MV filter makes use of more information, the judgements and assumptions
required to make the most of it begin to add up, at the cost of reduced transparency.
As well as the weights placed on the value of each relationship, their specification and
underpinning assumptions all affect the resulting output gap series. So, in some sense,
the weight placed on them is arbitrary. The myriad uncertainties and assumptions suggest
that a method such as this, and variants of it, should be considered as part of a suite of
indicators rather than providing a single point estimate.
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3.3.6 Principal components analysis
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique that attempts to draw a
common signal from a range of de-meaned, standardised cyclical indicators - which can
consist of survey measures of capacity utilisation, recruitment difficulties or inflation, for
example. The estimation process involves assigning weights to each of the data series
such that the resultant output gap series explains as much of the variability of the dataset
as possible. A detailed treatment of the PCA can be found in Jolliffe (2002).
Once a principal component has been estimated, its mean and standard deviation (a
scaling parameter) must be chosen. These choices are the main judgements upon which
PCA estimates of the output gap depend. One method would be to set the standard de-
viation such that the amplitude of the business cycle accords with some prior judgement.
Another would be to try to replicate the standard deviation of another output gap series.
Figure 27 illustrates the path of the output gap implied by the PCA, where the scaling
parameter and mean have been set in line with the standard deviation and mean of the
PC-filtered series (to maintain comparability). The PCA method estimates the output gap
directly from the cyclical indicators, so it makes no effort to smooth trend growth - the
additional volatility in trend growth relative to the PC filter is presented in Figure 3.30.
The PCA measures the output gap directly using data that are typically not revised,
which means that the principal component it produces in real time is unlikely to differ
very much from that which it estimates on an ex-post basis. However, the scaling param-
eter and mean might well change with the benefit of hindsight as these judgements are
updated. It is difficult to generate a real-time series of estimates using the PCA method,
but to get an indication of the scope for the PCA to be revised two vintages of its estimates
are considered.
The figure shows the PCA estimate that would be generated in real time using data
available up to and including the final quarter of 2007, with the standard deviation and
mean set to those from the PC-filter estimate of the output gap up to that point. It also
shows the PCA estimate using data up to the final quarter of 2013, with the standard
deviation and mean set to those of the PC filter up to the same point. It is clear from the
figure that the size of the pre-crisis boom now appears significantly larger than it did at
the time, for example. So the PCA is not very sensitive to data revisions but is sensitive
to changes in judgement over the scaling parameter and mean, with an average revision
of around 1.2 percentage points between the two vintages shown here.
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Figure 3.29: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent GDP using
the PC filter and PCA method.
Figure 3.30: Figure shows ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential growth using
the PC filter and PCA method.
3.3.7 Aggregate composite
The aggregate composite (AC) measure of the output gap uses similar data to that of
the PCA, described above. But, rather than estimating the weight to be placed on each
series based on the correlation of the dataset, these are set explicitly by the user. The
aggregated composite is a weighted average of survey indicators of capacity utilisation
and recruitment difficulties — where the weights are based on factor income and sector
shares.
Like the PCA, the AC must be adjusted and scaled either subjectively or to match
the mean and standard deviation properties of another output gap series. To construct the
estimates presented in Figure 3.31 and Figure 3.32, the mean and standard deviation is
set so that it is consistent with the PC filter estimates. The series is also spliced together
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Figure 3.31: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent GDP using
the PC filter and AC method.
Figure 3.32: Figure shows ex-post estimates of year-over-year potential growth using
the PC filter and AC method.
in the middle, since survey data for the services sector is unavailable prior to 1995 and
the estimates are calculated using only manufacturing data prior to that point.
Overall, the results are fairly similar to the PCA measure of the output gap and poten-
tial output growth. Like the PCA, the AC does not place any explicit weight on smoothing
potential output, but the amplitude of the cycle is constrained to be the same as the PC
filter estimates. The revisions properties are likely to be very similar to the PCA.
3.3.8 Credit-Augmented Principal Components Analysis
Before the 2008 financial crisis, there was little evidence of overheating in the UK econ-
omy — wage growth, inflation and unemployment were all at rates consistent with histor-
ical averages. Yet, most analysts and commentators now agree that there was something
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unsustainable about the strong growth in the years before the crisis hit — most estimates
of the output gap imply a significant and permanent hit to the level of potential produc-
tivity.
The period before the crisis saw significant growth of credit. To the extent that the
financial cycle and the business cycle are correlated, financial variables could be used
to inform estimates of the output gap. Indeed, output gaps augmented in this way may
better-explain the cyclical behaviour of tax receipts, since some are related to asset prices
and financial transactions. However, there are a number of practical problems in captur-
ing the influence of credit.
First, credit can rise as a share of GDP for structural reasons — deregulation in the
1980s increased mortgage availability while falling real interest rates in the 1990s made
mortgage payments more affordable, each boosting owner-occupation rates and so net
mortgage lending. For this reason, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
excludes some forms of lending in its preferred measure. However, even excluding loans
secured on dwellings, loans for direct investment and derivatives, the liabilities of house-
holds, corporations and not for profit entities rose from rose from about 130 per cent of
GDP in 2000 to around 170 per cent of GDP in 2007, before falling back during the
recession.
Second, there is no direct relationship between credit and GDP (it is not a factor of
production), and there is no structural relationship between the credit gap and the output
gap. Instead it is treated as an indicator and how much emphasis to place on it requires
judgement.
The BCBS-recommended credit gap measure, which the Bank of England publishes
and the FPC uses to inform its policy decisions, is replicated in Figure 3.33. It is a real-
time series produced using the HP filter with the smoothing parameter set to 400,000 —
for further details see BOE (2014) and BaselCommittee (2010). The series indicates a
significant financial boom in the late 1980s and a smaller one before the recent financial
crisis. The ex-post series is also presented, which shares the same broad features as the
real-time series but indicates that the 1980s credit boom starting somewhat later. It is also
consistent with a bigger credit cycle in 2007/08 than it would have suggested using data
available to policy makers at the time.
More broadly, this version of the credit gap does not tally especially well with conven-
tional wisdom over the cyclical position of the economy. Because balance sheet move-
ments are a relatively slow process, the credit gap is very persistent and recoveries can
start long before leverage begins to rise. So a credit gap may help to inform judgements
about the sustainability of growth and risk in the financial system but might be less useful
as a real-time indicator of slack in the economy and, therefore, the scope for growth as
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Figure 3.33: Figure shows Credit Gap as a percent of GDP
Figure 3.34: Figure shows ex-post estimates of the output gap as a percent GDP using
the PC filter and credit filter.
it is taken up. This persistence is evident in the output gap estimates produced using an
augmented PC filter, in real time and the revised, ex-post estimates.
An alternative method of taking on board information from the credit gap, when
estimating the output gap, is to add it as a relevant indicator to a principal components
analysis. However, PCA estimates are not drastically affected by the inclusion of the
credit gap - largely this is because its low correlation with other variables means it is
assigned a low weight when a common signal is extracted. There are still further ways in
which to incorporate financial information into estimates of the output gap — see Borio
et al (2013), for example — but each must grapple with the differing frequencies of the
financial and output cycles.
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Figure 3.35: Figure shows real-time estimates of the output gap as a percent GDP using
the PC filter and credit filter.
3.3.9 Production function approach
A production function is simply an equation that relates inputs to the production process
to outputs. That is to say, the level of potential output is a function of labour supply, the
capital stock and the maximum efficiency with which they can be combined (total factor
productivity (TFP)). To estimate the output gap, the actual level of output is compared
with this potential level.
There are two key judgements associated with production function estimates of the
output gap. The first is the choice of production technology — an economic theory
that relates the inputs to the outputs. How might output be expected to change with the
addition of another unit of capital or labour, for example? The second is the choice of
method for estimating the potential levels of the factor inputs and total factor productivity,
which are to be aggregated using the specified production technology.
The production technology can take many forms, but, in what follows, the baseline
Cobb-Douglas approach is taken, Douglas (1948), and the standard assumptions are used.
It is assumed that the production process is characterised by a function of the form:
y = A(LαK(1−α)) (3.32)
where A is TFP, L is labour input, K is the capital stock, α and (1−α) are the output
elasticities of labour and capital, respectively. This particular function is consistent with
a number of assumptions:
• constant returns to scale;
• the marginal productivity of each factor being proportionate to its average produc-
tivity;
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• technology being Hicks neutral - technological improvements increase the returns
to labour and capital in equal measure; and
• under the additional assumption of perfect competition in the product market, fac-
tors are paid their marginal products, the steady-state labour share of income is,
therefore, stable and can be used to calibrate the elasticity of factor inputs with
respect to output.
The functional form of the Cobb-Douglas production function is largely one of conve-
nience, since it is easy to work with. An alternative would be the, more general, Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, which could be consistent with a
trending labour share of income, for example.1 However, as Miller (2008) shows, there
is little evidence that supports the use of one over the other when the objective is to fore-
cast GDP or factor shares, provided the labour share of income is stable. Absent cyclical
fluctuations, the UK labour share of income appears broadly stable over the past few
decades, so the more tractable Cobb-Douglas specification is used.
Now that a production technology has been selected, it is necessary to estimate the
trend series for labour, capital and TFP. Almost all practitioners of this approach do this
by using filters of some sort, so it stands to reason that the estimates it produces share
many similarities with those obtained via the methods described earlier in this paper
(rather than constituting an estimation technique in its own right).2 It does, however,
enable the user to interrogate the estimates with economic theory, by decomposing the
output gap into contributions from TFP and the factors of production.
In what follows, labour supply is defined as potential hours worked and comprises
potential average hours worked and potential employment. Potential employment, itself,
consists of potential participation in the labour market as a share of potential population
less the structural rate of unemployment - the NAWRU.
To estimate the trend series used to construct the production function, I:
• assume the population gap is zero at all times by setting potential equal to actual;
• apply a stiff PC filter to the activity rate to identify potential participation;
• take the NAWRU estimates used by the MV and Okun-augmented PC filters —
estimated using the PC filter and a wage equation;
• apply a stiff PC filter with drift to actual average hours to obtain potential average
hours;
1Barnes et al. (2008) finds evidence using firm-level data that would support the use of a CES produc-
tion function.
2The European Commission’s approach is set out in D’Auria et al. (2010), for example.
3.3. MULTIVARIATE METHODS 83
Figure 3.36: Figure shows real-time and ex-post output gap estimates from a production
function as a percent of GDP
• assume the potential capital input is equivalent to utilising the existing capital
stock; and
• apply a PC filter with drift to the level of actual TFP to obtain potential TFP.
Clearly, the assumptions underpinning the production function estimates of potential
output are numerous and susceptible to exactly the same sorts of issues identified in
earlier filter applications. And any number of filter or specification choices could be
made that could be expected to yield different estimates. The output gap is estimated
by comparing the level of potential output with the actual value. Furthermore, the actual
values of the factor inputs and TFP can be compared with their potential values, taking
the production technology into account, to give contributions to the output gap from each
— the principal purpose of the exercise.
Figure 3.36 and Figure 3.37 illustrate the output gap and potential output growth paths
produced by the production function approach. In many ways, they are unremarkable
since they look similar to estimates produced by some of the methods described above.
But the advantage of using a production function estimate is that we can decompose the
output gap into contributions from the factor inputs and TFP.
Figure 3.38 and Figure 3.39 illustrate two approaches to decomposing the output gap
into contributions. The first is perhaps the most intuitive, since it breaks the gap down into
straight-forward contributions from employment, average hours and labour productivity
deviations from trend.
The figures shows that the estimate of the output gap is made up of a negative contri-
bution from employment and a smaller contribution from labour productivity lying below
their potential levels, partly offset by a positive contribution from average hours exceed-
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Figure 3.37: Figure shows real-time and ex-post estimates of potential growth from a
production function
Figure 3.38: Figure shows the output gap decomposed into contributions from average
hours, employment and labour productivity in percentage points
ing its long-run downward trend. More generally, this approach is consistent with the
employment gap driving much of the cyclical variation of output with smaller contribu-
tions from other sources.
Another, more detailed decomposition gives us an indication of the TFP and capital
intensity contributions to the output gap. This method shows that much of the current
labour productivity gap is accounted for by TFP falling short of its potential level. Capital
per worker (K/L) appears now to be making a neutral contribution to the output gap,
having contributed positively since the recession started.
The production function can also be used to infer what other methods of output gap
estimation say about the level of potential TFP. In what follows the contributions of po-
tential labour and capital input used to construct the production function are subtracted
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Figure 3.39: Figure shows the output gap decomposed into contributions from average
hours, employment and total factor productivity and the capital to labour ratio in percent-
age points
from the level of potential output associated with each method, leaving estimates of po-
tential TFP.1
Figure 3.40 shows that each of the HP, MV, PCA, PC and production function (PF)
methods is consistent with a significant and permanent fall in the level of potential TFP
over the crisis period (although the HP filter dates the start of the slowdown as pre-
crisis). Interesting too, is that most of the methods are unable to explain the weakness
of productivity over 2012, instead, attributing it to weaker potential TFP growth. While
breaking production function estimates of the output gap into factor contributions, and
considering the TFP implications of other estimation methods, may give some insight
into how the output gap might have evolved, the results should be considered in the
context of the wider uncertainties surrounding output gap estimation.
3.3.10 Summary Statistics for the Estimation Methods
The table below describes a few key statistics, where available, for the methods presented
above, as well as some metrics for a production function estimated using market sector
data (described in the annex). Some methods are excluded from the summary statistics,
including the AC model, the BN decomposition, the CF filter, the H filter the market
sector production function model and the PCA model.
1To facilitate this comparison, the production function and labour-market augmented filters use the
same estimate of the NAWRU.
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Figure 3.40: Figure shows level of potential TFP implied by the output gap estimates
from a range of different methods
Figure 3.41: Figure shows growth of potential TFP implied by the output gap estimates
from a range of different methods
3.4 Quantifying Uncertainty
3.4.1 Model Uncertainty
This section summarises the estimates presented in the preceding sections. The many
model assumptions and possible judgements required to estimate the output gap are borne
out in the wide range of estimates produced — illustrated in Figure 3.42.1 And, of course,
this range could expand with the inclusion of other methods.
The range of output gap estimates was around 4.7 percentage points over 2013 as a
whole, which compared with a range of estimates made by external analysts at the end
1For the purposes of constructing the figure, estimates associated with the linear trend, Hamilton and
credit gap methodologies are excluded.
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Figure 3.42: Figure shows the range of output gap estimates from a variety of selected
estimation methods. The black line is the mean estimate and all are expressed as a
percent of GDP
of 2013 of 5.7 percentage points.1 There must, therefore, be a more diverse popula-
tion of definitions, methods and judgements applied by other analysts than is presented
here, indicating that it is worth considering a broader range of evidence when reaching a
judgement on spare capacity.
It has been suggested that aggregating estimates from a range of models may reduce
sensitivity of the measures to model-specific bias - Armstrong (2001). The mean of
model estimates is presented in Figure 3.42, but it is worth considering that this, in some
sense, is arbitrary because it places an equal weight on each measure and there is no
reason to suppose each is equally plausible.
Nonetheless, the figure shows that the range of uncertainty varies substantially over
the sample period and that the average of estimates rarely lies in the centre of that dis-
tribution. Overall, the range of estimates provided by these methods alone is about 3.6
percentage points on average between 1972 and 2013 and that’s with the benefit of hind-
sight — they use the full run of data available now.
3.4.2 End-point Uncertainty
Figure 3.43 illustrates the tendency of each measure to be revised, though this should
not be the only criteria one considers when assessing the performance of output gap
measures. The average (excluding the linear methodology) is some 1.7 percentage points.
While the overall magnitude of revisions to output gap estimates is very large, it is also
variable. The figure shows that there are substantial differences in the revisions properties
of the models presented, with estimates generated by linear de-trending much more likely
1See HM-Treasury (2013).
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Figure 3.43: Figure shows the mean revision between real-time and ex-post output gap
estimates for a range of methods
Figure 3.44: Figure shows the standard deviation of output gap estimates for a range of
methods
to be revised than the multivariate filter, for example. Likewise, the volatility of the output
gap and potential growth vary significantly between methods.
Figure 3.46 shows that, generally speaking, the lower the standard deviation of po-
tential output growth, the more prone is an output gap measure to revision. Linear de-
trending, for example, lies in the south-east corner - it assumes a constant potential output
growth rate, but its output gap estimates are revised the most. Another way of thinking
about it is that a linear growth model places the most weight on information from the
future (the whole sample determines the slope of the line) in determining its estimates of
the output gap. So, naturally, as more data become available it makes big revisions to its
earlier estimates. Other methods place less weight on future information and, therefore,
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Figure 3.45: Figure shows the standard deviation of potential growth estimates for a
range of methods
Figure 3.46: Figure plots the mean revision against the standard deviation of potential
growth for a range of output gap estimation methods
they tend to be revised less1.
The methods presented above are by no means intended to capture all the methods
of output gap estimation available to forecasters, but it does capture a wide range, which
is reflected in the variability of estimates over time. There are other methods not con-
sidered here, such as the multivariate Kalman filter, as applied by Konuki (2008). In
practice, this is very similar to the MV (PC) filter, presented above. The parameters of a
multivariate Kalman model must be calibrated, often under the assumption that they are
deep parameters - i.e. stable and based on microeconomic evidence. The PC filter also
depends upon calibration and some of the parameters could be considered reduced-form
1The statistics for the Phillips Curve method are over a sample from 1995-2013, as uncertainty over the
steady state of inflation in the earlier years of the sample causes significant revisions that are not considered
relevant to this comparison.
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representations of structural relationships.
The MV (PC) filter requires explicit judgements over smoothing parameters and the
weights placed on explaining the path of potential output, while a Kalman model re-
quires explicit priors over the size of shocks to its measurement equations. Likewise,
estimates produced using models that utilise Bayesian methods — such as Benesˇ et al.
(2010) — require priors over the size of model parameters and shocks as well as their
underlying distributions. Fundamentally, since potential output is a notion constructed
by economists, all methods used to estimate it need to be told how volatile it is - there is
no escaping this key judgement.
The key point to take away from this analysis is that the choice of model really matters
to the estimates made. The reason they differ so much is because they embody different
assumptions about the process that drives trend output and the how the indicators used
reflect deviations of the economy from it. Some models do not fit with commonly held
views about these processes – the HP filter is one. Yet the Hamilton filter also embodies
assumption which may not match the process driving GDP either.
There is one question all researchers should ask before applying any method to sepa-
rate trend from cycle. Are the assumptions embodied in the chosen method appropriate
for the process being modelled?
3.4.3 Data Uncertainty
It is a well-documented finding that optimal ex-post monetary policy prescriptions appear
different from those made in real time and that this mostly reflects the unreliability of
output gap estimates in real time — see Orphanides & Norden (2002). In these papers, the
authors assess the revisions properties of a range of output gap estimates for the United
States, including linear de-trending, the HP filter, an Okun relation and an unobserved
components model augmented to include the Phillips curve. Across all measures, the
role of data revisions is found to be relatively small in explaining policy errors, when
compared with those arising from the end-point problem.
Marcellino & Musso (2011) find that output gap revisions for euro area economies are
substantial and of equal magnitude to the output gap estimates themselves - they find that
data revisions account only for a small part of this. While Cayen & Van Norden (2005)
find that revisions to output gap estimates for Canada are significant but can mainly be
attributed to data revisions.
To see which of these findings hold for the UK, revisions to HP filter estimates of
the output gap from two sources are assessed — from new data and revised data. The
sensitivity of output gap estimates to data revisions is assessed first. To this end, an HP
filter is applied to both the real-time GDP data and the current vintage and the results
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Figure 3.47: Figure shows HP-filtered estimates of the output gap using the first avail-
able and current vintage of GDP data as a percent of GDP
Figure 3.48: Dashed line shows output gap revision owing to revisions to the first esti-
mate of GDP, while solid line shows the revision to the output gap reflecting the arrival of
new data points in the series.
are compared. The average absolute output gap revision arising from GDP data revisions
from the first quarter of 1978 to the final quarter of 2011 is around 0.7 percentage points.
I then compare the one- and two-sided HP filter estimates applied to the current vin-
tage of GDP data — the average revision owing to the arrival of new data (which is called
the benefit of hindsight here, although that would also include updates to model param-
eters, for example) is found to be around 1.4 percentage points. The influence of data
revisions on output gap estimates is presented in Figure 3.46, while the sources of output
gap revision are illustrated in Figure 3.47.
The results suggest that, on average, the benefit of hindsight is about twice as useful
as better data when it comes to improving HP-filtered estimates of the output gap —
although this conclusion would probably be affected by the choice of estimation method.
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The results obtained here lie between those for Canada, where output gap revisions are
mostly attributable to data revisions, and the US and euro area, where data revisions
play a much smaller role. It is unclear why data revisions should play a different role in
UK output gap revisions than in other countries. UK GDP prior to the recent financial
crisis now look a bit stronger than early vintages implied, and the recession a bit deeper.
To the extent that revisions like this are not features of the data in other countries, the
proportion of output gap revisions owing to data revisions will differ from the UK. Of
course, history will continue to be rewritten as methodological improvements come to
change our understanding of the past.
3.4.4 Summarising Uncertainty
Overall, the results show just how slippery a concept the output gap is. Uncertainty comes
from three sources:
• a failure to pin down the process that underlies potential growth — Overall, dif-
ferent judgements over how the economy functions drives a gap between selected
measures of the output gap that has averaged 3.6 percentage points since 1970;
• the benefit of hindsight — knowing how the economy evolved after a shock, for
example, tells something about the sustainability of the economy before it. On
average, revisions from this source were about 1.7 percentage points since 1970;
and
• revisions to past data are a smaller source of uncertainty than the benefit of hind-
sight or model uncertainty, associated with revisions to output gap estimates of
about 0.7 percentage points on average since 1978.
3.5 How Smooth is Potential Output?
A common feature of all the output gap estimation methods summarised above is that
they are underpinned by assumptions, explicitly or implicitly, about the smoothness of
potential output. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and prior-constrained (PC) filters, for exam-
ple, require explicit judgements over the choice of smoothing parameter.
The amplitude of the cycle obtained using principal components depends on the
choice of scaling parameter, which determines the medium-term variation in potential
output. Directly estimating the output gap with principal components also allows very
high frequency movements in the survey data and measurement error to feed through to
the level of potential.
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Figure 3.49: Figure shows different sources of output gap uncertainty. Bars represent
mean revision owing to that source.
The production function approach allows the user to apply more disaggregated judge-
ments to arrive at an overall smoothness. For example, the structural rate of unemploy-
ment, which depends on things like the degree of wage indexation to inflation and union
intensity, might be less variable than potential total factor productivity (TFP) over time.
Yet, once decisions have been made about the smoothness of the other components of
potential output, one is left with the crucial judgement over the smoothness of potential
TFP. Unfortunately, the economics profession has little to say about the processes that de-
termine it, which makes judgements about its potential level, volatility and likely growth
rate dependent on historical averages — the key judgement being how much weight to
place on the recent past relative to longer time periods.
For example, most economic commentators viewed the sustained period of strong
productivity growth in the UK over the 2000s as being structural. And, with no theory to
suggest otherwise, it was hard to make the opposite argument. During the 2008 financial
crisis, TFP fell sharply, and has barely grown in the subsequent six years. This perfor-
mance has prompted some to revisit their assumptions about the sustainability of growth
in the preceding years. This is illustrated in Figure 3.50, which shows the output gap path
the OECD published before the crisis, in 2007, and the one it published in 2014. And to
a lesser extent in Figure 3.51, which shows the Treasury and, latterly, OBR estimates.
The OECD, which uses a production function method, estimated with a two-sided
filter, now judges that there was a significant positive output gap in 2007 of around 5 per
cent. This interpretation is consistent with potential TFP growth having slowed substan-
tially in the years before the crisis started. Partly, this reflects the properties of the HP
filter, which penalises sharp movements in potential output. An alternative interpretation,
from the multivariate (MV) filter or principal components analysis (PCA), for example,
is that potential TFP continued to grow at roughly its usual rate up until the crisis began,
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Figure 3.50: Figure shows two different vintages of the OECD’s output gap estimate for
the UK.
Figure 3.51: Figure shows two different vintages of the UK government’s output gap
estimates
but fell sharply during it.
So which interpretation seems more plausible? Potential TFP growth is considered
to reflect advances in technology and improvements in efficiency (such as better process
management, for example). It is difficult to understand how a substantial TFP gap could
open up, since it implies excessive utilisation of technology available at the time —
working the capital stock at unsustainable rates, for example. Yet there was no evidence
of this in the period before the crisis.
But it is also hard to see how the state of technology and efficiency can suddenly
regress so far — have we forgotten how to do things we could do previously? Or is it
that some of the things we were doing, which seemed to make things more efficient at the
time, turned out to be less useful than we thought (some activities of the shadow banking
sector, for example)? All we really have to go in is that actual TFP fell and has barely
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grown for six years and either the gap or level hypothesis could be correct.
So, it is important to recognise that different methods for estimating the output gap
are consistent with different interpretations of the process driving TFP. The implication
is that output gaps should not just be ranked on their tendency for revision: a method
that assumes potential TFP can fall sharply will tend to be revised by less than a method
that assumes it cannot. Given the scant theory on the subject, there is no strong case
for favouring one view of the world over the other, so both should be considered when
making a judgement and neither discarded on the basis of tendency for revision.
3.6 Mapping to the Public Finances
The UK Government sets fiscal policy such that a measure of balance is restored to the
public finances over a rolling five-year horizon. In doing so it takes into account the effect
of the cycle on revenues and spending, which requires an estimate of the output gap. In
practice, every forecast of GDP is underpinned by an assessment (implicit or explicit)
of spare capacity and, therefore, how much scope there is for above-trend growth as it
is taken up. This section considers the sensitivity of cyclically-adjusted measures of the
fiscal aggregates to output gap mismeasurement.
Recent years have seen the emergence of new literature concerned with the reliabil-
ity of cyclically-adjusted measures of fiscal aggregates. As reported in Tereanu et al.
(2014) a number of papers have assessed output gap uncertainty and some explore the
implications for measures of the public finances:
• Koske & Pain (2008) find that revised output gap estimates account for cyclically-
adjusted public borrowing revisions of around 0.4 percentage points, on average,
across a range of OECD countries;
• Bouis et al. (2013) find that output gap revisions average 1 to 1.5 percentage points
in OECD countries, but that underlying fiscal balances are not very sensitive to
this;
• Hughes Hallett et al. (2012) find that revisions to cyclically adjusted public bor-
rowing estimates owing to output gap revisions average around 1 percentage point
in most euro area economies; and
• Ley & Misch (2013) find that revisions have substantial effects on measures of the
structural balance.
In what follows, the measurement of cyclically adjusted public sector net borrowing
(CAPSNB) is considered. It is first perhaps useful to set out the wide band of uncer-
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Figure 3.52: Solid line is the cyclically-adjusted public sector net borrowing balance
as a share of GDP. The shaded area represents the range of estimates using different
methods of output gap estimation. Note:Data are cyclically-adjusted PSNB from 1994-
95, and the cyclically adjusted public sector borrowing requirement before that.
tainty surrounding CAPSNB — this is illustrated in Figure 3.52, which presents esti-
mates based on the suite of output gap measures presented in this paper and ex-post
data. Uncertainty over point estimates of the output gap carries over to CAPSNB via the
cyclical-adjustment coefficients, roughly 0.7 for 1.1
Uncertainty over point estimates of the CAPSNB is compounded by uncertainty over
how estimates might change in future. CAPSNB can be revised for three reasons, of
which this section considers the first two:
• the public sector finances and output data can be revised;
• estimates of the output gap can change; and
• estimates of the sensitivity of the public finances to the cycle can be updated.
So what might be the greater source of uncertainty? To assess this, the CAPSNB is
first estimated using initial estimates of PSNB as a share of GDP and a real-time measure
of the output gap — in this case given by the one-sided PC filter. This serves as a baseline
case.
To assess sensitivity to output gap revisions, it is shown how the estimates change
when the CAPSNB is calculated using an ex-post output gap (a two-sided PC filter).
Finally, the CAPSNB is estimated using both the latest fiscal data and an ex-post output
gap, to capture the effect of data revisions. The results are presented in Figure 3.53.
The dark bars in Figure 3.53 can be interpreted as total revision owing to revised
fiscal data (and in-year forecast errors), while the lighter bars are revisions because the
1See Helgadottir et al. (2012)
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Figure 3.53: Figure decomposes the overall revision to estimates of structural borrow-
ing into that caused by output gap revisions and that reflecting actual borrowing data
revisions.
output gap path is now thought to be different — the purple and blue bars sum to the total
CAPSNB revision. The figure shows that the estimates of structural borrowing through
the financial crisis presented here are revised much higher once data revisions and revised
output gap paths are taken into account — with the latter playing the dominant role. This
is consistent with the findings of Tereanu et al, who state that ”during the crisis years,
the estimates of CAPB were considerably worse for most countries after they were re-
estimated following budget execution”.
On average, the magnitude of revisions to CAPSNB owing to output gap revisions is
around 1 percentage point, far larger than the average revision arising from revised data
of 0.3 percentage points.1 So output gap uncertainty is likely to be the larger source of
uncertainty over the structural fiscal position in real time, although selecting other mea-
sures of the output gap with different revisions properties could affect this conclusion.
This result is consistent with the findings of Hallett et al (2009), who find that CAPB
revisions owing to output gap revisions are around 1 percentage point on average.
The average output gap revision across the range of methods applied to UK data
earlier is around 1.3 percentage points. This is roughly consistent with the findings of
Tereanu et al, who find that the average revision for EU countries is around 1.5 percentage
points. Using cyclical adjustment coefficients summing to 0.7, it would be reasonable to
assume that revisions to CAPSNB would be close to 1 percentage point using that range
of methods.
It is worth noting that the analysis above suggests that revisions to the CACB tend to
be largest around turning points, also consistent with the conclusion reached by Tereanu
et al. This is problematic, since these are precisely the moments when policymakers most
1For simplicity, the revision to the output gap does not take into account revisions to the path of GDP
so output gap uncertainty may be an even larger source of uncertainty.
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need them to be reliable.
This section has shown that output gap mismeasurement is a significant source of
uncertainty over the real-time fiscal position and probably a larger one than revisions to
the public finances data. But it is worth remembering that, when fiscal policy objectives
are set in the future, the output gap is only one part of what is needed to forecast the
cyclically-adjusted fiscal position. One also needs to make a judgement about how fast
the economy might be able to grow on a sustainable basis. This paper is not concerned
with that issue, although it is likely to be as important.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper began by emphasising that the policy horizon should be taken into account
when formulating the definition of the output gap. This reflects the possibility that fiscal
authorities and central banks may have different perspectives, particularly when output
gaps are large. Output gap estimates are prone to revision, not least because the output
gap is a concept invented by economists that cannot be observed, only estimated. Three
sources of output gap revision were then identified — those arising from the arrival of
new data, revisions to past data and changes to model specification.
It has been shown that revisions owing to the arrival of new data are large and, on
average, tend to be of the same magnitude as the output gap estimates themselves. Output
gap revisions owing to revised data are also significant, while the range of output gap
estimates produced by the handful of methods presented here is substantial. Overall, the
level of uncertainty about the size of the output gap is high and it is shown that this carries
over to estimates of the cyclically adjusted fiscal position, while revisions to public sector
finances data also contribute to a smaller degree.
Along the way, it has been illustrated that the assumptions underpinning various
methods for estimating the output gap are consistent with different views of how the
economy functions — in particular, about the time series properties of potential produc-
tivity, about which little is known. Whether the views underpinning a methodology are
explicit or implicit, they represent the application of judgement to the estimation of spare
capacity. No methodology can be made totally free from judgement.
The important conclusion from this analysis is that no statistical filter should be ap-
plied blindly. It is all too easy to apply an HP filter or a form of the Kalman filter to data
without asking whether the underlying process is consistent with the, often very restric-
tive, assumptions embodied in the filter. The HP filter may have a use but, as Hamilton
suggests, detrending GDP is probably not one of them. Indeed, detrending GDP may not
even be the best application of the Hamilton filter.
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All medium-term forecasts of the public finances embody an assumption, implicit or
explicit, about spare capacity. Yet, given the substantial degree of output gap uncertainty,
there may good reason to tread cautiously when setting fiscal policy. Such an approach
would be consistent with the Brainard Principle of policy conservatism. Further work
in this area might assess how the optimality of fiscal rules is affected by output gap
uncertainty.
3.8 Annex
3.8.1 Estimating the structural rate of unemployment
Some of the methods presented in this paper make use of the structural rate of unem-
ployment to estimate the output gap. To ensure consistency between those methods, the
structural rate of unemployment is estimated in advance of output gap estimation. To do
this, it is assumed that the structural rate is a random walk without drift and the PC filter
is applied to it. This filter is augmented to include information from real wages, adjusted
for underlying movements in productivity growth — the estimated structural rate can,
therefore, be thought of as a long-term non-accelerating wages rate of unemployment
(NAWRU).
The long-run NAWRU is estimated in state space using the Kalman filter and is given
by Equations 32 to 38:
Signal :ut = u
∗
t + uct (3.33)






State :uct = 1, t (3.35)
State :cwt = prod
∗
t + β5uct + β6uct−1 + 1, t (3.36)













State :prodct = 1, t (3.39)
I posit a simple relationship between the growth of real product wages, as measured
by average earnings deflated by the gross value added deflator at factor cost, the unem-
ployment rate gap and a measure of trend productivity growth – to capture underlying
movements in labour productivity (unrelated to the cycle) that could influence wages.
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Figure 3.54: Figure shows a simple PC filter estimate of the NAWRU and another in
which that filter is augmented with wages data – both are real-time estimates.
Figure 3.55: Figure shows a simple PC filter estimate of the NAWRU and another in
which that filter is augmented with wages data – both are ex-post estimates.
The labour productivity trend is jointly estimated with the NAWRU. The coefficients are
calibrated drawing from evidence, including Greenslade et al. (2003).
Figure 3.54 and Figure 3.55 show the effect of including wages on the NAWRU
estimates, relative to using the naeve univariate PC filter. Because real wages growth
was low and stable in the 2000s, the PC filter is able to identify that the NAWRU must
have fallen in the preceding years. Likewise, the weakness of real product wages growth
during and following the recession helps the filter to identify more cyclical weakness in
unemployment, preventing a significant increase in the long-run NAWRU estimate.
This, combined with the stiffness of the filter, is consistent with the view that little
has changed in the structure of the labour market over that period, and that the long-term
unemployed will eventually find their way back into employment, for example.
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Figure 3.56: Figure shows the filtered real-time and ex-post estimates of trend average
hours, together with the actual data.
3.8.2 Estimating potential average hours
Average hours have drifted downwards for centuries, as productivity has risen and addi-
tional income has been substituted for more leisure time. To model trend average hours,
the PC filter is applied with drift to the average hours series using a stiff smoothing param-
eter. The real-time and ex-post results are illustrated in Figure 3.56. A key uncertainty is
the extent to which the latest increase in average hours reflects a permanent response to
a loss of permanent income relative to prior expectations. The estimate presented here is
consistent with average hours eventually falling back to the long-run trend.
3.8.3 Estimating potential activity
Potential activity has also been estimated using the PC filter but, unlike average hours,
without a drift term — the estimates are presented in Figure 55. Further information
relating to demographic influences on participation rates could be introduced via a cohort
model, for example, but that is not explored here.
3.8.4 Taking account of market sector information
Many of the traditional methods used to estimate the output gap are based on inferring
supply from the balance of demand. But demand is really a market sector concept, so it
would make sense to estimate the output gap on this basis. In what follows, it is shown
that variations in the output of the non-marketed sector of the economy contribute to
output gap volatility when measured on a whole-economy basis. This is best investigated
using the production function approach.
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Figure 3.57: Figure shows the filtered real-time and ex-post estimates of trend activity,
together with the actual data.
To arrive at a whole-economy equivalent measure for the output gap, non-marketed
TFP, labour input and capital are assumed to be at their trend values at all times. Ac-
tual values for market sector unemployment, hours and activity (labour input) are com-
bined using the production function methodology with estimates of the capital stock and
market-sector, non-oil GVA to arrive at series for market sector TFP. These series are
then de-trended to arrive at an estimate of the market sector output gap.
Figure 3.58 and Figure 3.59 show that using market sector data does affect estimates
of the whole-economy output gap. This is largely because it excludes any information
from the government sector, which, theoretically, should not be cyclical, and avoids the
issues associated with the measurement of its output.1 The differences are, though, typi-
cally small, particularly over the past 25 years.
Figure 3.60 shows that the level of actual TFP in the market sector fell by substan-
tially more in the most recent recession than in the economy as a whole, which is to be
expected because of the way in which public sector productivity is measured - market
sector TFP fell nearly 81
2
per cent from peak to trough, compared with around 6 per cent
in the economy as a whole. It also fell more sharply in 2012 than did whole economy
productivity. For this reason, trend (filtered) estimates of market sector TFP appear to
continue falling, long after trend whole economy TFP stabilises.
The conclusion to draw from this is that the way in which public sector productivity
is measured could muddy the picture of the process we really want to examine — it is the
growth of market sector TFP which matters most for projections of receipts, for example.
But the price paid for this more disaggregated information is greater complexity and
1See Atkinson (2006) for a full discussion of the challenges associated with measuring government
output in the UK.
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Figure 3.58: Figure shows two estimates of the output gap using different measures of
economic activity.
Figure 3.59: Figure shows the differences in output gap estimates between whole econ-
omy and market sector only data.
dependency on the assumptions required to construct a market sector data set.
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Figure 3.60: Figure shows two estimates of total factor productivity using different mea-
sures of economic activity.
Figure 3.61: Figure shows two estimates of potential total factor productivity using dif-
ferent measures of economic activity.
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4
Modelling State-Contingent Fiscal Rules
in the United Kingdom
4.1 Introduction
Fiscal rules come and go. That’s particularly true in the United Kingdom where many
incarnations have made their way through parliament in recent years. Finding one that
lasts would be a leap forward, especially since there is only very weak global evidence
that they are binding - Heinemann et al. (2018).
In what follows, I focus on a rule that was extremely short-lived - it was proposed by
the government in 2015, HM-Treasury (2015) and abandoned a year later, HM-Treasury
(2016). It had two interesting features which are worthy of consideration, even now the
rule has been discarded:
• it explicitly gave the government flexibility to delay fiscal consolidation when the
economy is hit by a significant negative shock; and
• it defined a significant negative shock as being when GDP growth slows or is fore-
cast to slow to 1% on a rolling 4 quarter-on-4 quarter basis.
I explore the merits of these features in turn. First, by asking whether this type of
flexibility helps dampen the impact of shocks — intuition suggests that it should. Second,
by assessing how using a GDP growth threshold might differ from using estimates of the
output gap for the identification of significant shocks.
107
4.1. INTRODUCTION 108
4.1.1 The Golden Rule — 1998 to 2008
Before 1998 Britain was a lawless place, fiscally speaking. It wasn’t until Gordon Brown
arrived at the Treasury that the government bound itself by rules of its own choosing. The
experience ever since then has been that when the circumstances change, the goalposts
move.
The original rules were twofold.
• The golden rule: over the economic cycle, the government will borrow only to
invest and not to fund current spending. In other words it will run a surplus on the
current budget, on average.
• The sustainable investment rule: over the economic cycle, the ratio of net pub-
lic sector debt to GDP will be set at a ‘stable and prudent’ level, defined by the
Chancellor as no more than 40% of GDP.
The logic of the rules is reasonable. Both are intended to ensure that public spending
is spread fairly across generations - none should have to deal with the consequences of
another’s profligacy. That borrowing only had to be balanced over the cycle meant there
was also scope to support the economy at times of weakness. The rules also permit
spending on investment, which tends to be squeezed out in favour of current spending if
it is not protected.
A couple of issues, noted at the time Emmerson et al. (2001) are that the debt level
chosen is arbitrary — there’s no particular reason to favour 40% over other figures. The
definition of investment is also narrow — why should it be limited to investment in cap-
ital when spending on human capital such as health and education also offer returns on
investment?
Another is that the backward-looking nature of the rule meant that if surpluses were
run in early years of an economic cycle, deficits could be run in later years. That may be
sustainable over the economic cycle but it means the public finances end the cycle in a
poor position — as was the case on the eve of the financial crisis.
So how did the rules fair? Not so well.
The loophole was the economic cycle, which is a subjective concept open to exploita-
tion. The forecasts for revenue growth also proved too optimistic, creating deficit bias.
Both were easy to manipulate because the prisoners were also the guards – the Treasury
held all the keys.
Budget surpluses run in the Labour government’s first term meant a deficit could be
run in later years and the overall current budget would average zero. Even then, in 2005,
the deficit was big enough to put that in jeopardy. The solution was to shift the timing
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of the cycle earlier. By saying the economic cycle began in 1997 rather than 1999, more
years of surplus were captured within it, making the target easier to hit.
With regard to the next cycle, the Treasury was serially optimistic on the scope for
a lift to revenue as spare capacity was taken up. Again, part of the trouble was that the
economy was judged to be operating below trend when, even at the time, most economists
thought it was running at or close to full capacity.
The result was that when the global financial crisis struck, Britain was running a sub-
stantial structural budget deficit that was larger than its peers. The general conclusion,
Riley & Chote (2014) is that fiscal policy ahead of the global financial crisis was not the
reason the public finances deteriorated when it struck. But weaknesses in fiscal manage-
ment left the government with much less room to manoeuvre than it perhaps should have
had.
4.1.2 Temporary Operating Rule — 2008 to 2010
As the U.K. economy plunged into crisis, an operating rule was put in place. The Novem-
ber 2008 objective was to ”set policies to improve the cyclically-adjusted current budget
each year, once the economy emerges from the downturn, so it reaches balance and debt
is falling as a proportion of GDP once the global shocks have worked their way through
the economy in full” HM-Treasury (2008).
The report contained a number of stimulus measures to support the economy during
the downturn and it was imagined that the current budget would not be balanced until the
2015/16 financial year. In other words, pragmatism saw to it that the right fiscal policy
was pursued during the crisis, but that came at the expense of the fiscal rules that went
before it.
A natural question to ask is whether there is a specification that could explicitly permit
fiscal flexibility during a downturn, such that the rules do not have to be junked? If
binding at other times, such a rule would be more credible. The 2015 rule comes close,
but there were plenty of others in between.
4.1.3 Fiscal Responsibility Act — Feb 2010 to June 2010
This one didn’t last long. The Labour government’s last Budget, HM-Treasury (2010),
refined plans for the path of public spending and taxation in subsequent years and coded
them into law. The fiscal objective was for borrowing to fall as a share of GDP in each of
the subsequent years — but even on those plans the government would still be running a
substantial deficit even five years hence.
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4.1.4 Fiscal Mandate and Supplementary Target - 2010 to 2015
The arrival of a new Coalition government marked a major change to fiscal management.
The new fiscal rule was to achieve cyclically-adjusted current balance, by the end of the
rolling, five-year forecast period, and for public sector net debt to be falling at a fixed
date of 2015-16.
In principle, the rule was similar to the golden rule — it offered limited flexibility
during fiscal shocks and protected investment spending. But the main difference was
that it was forward rather than backward looking. To police these targets an independent
fiscal institution was also created, the Office for Budget Responsibility. The fudging of
the economic cycle and revenue forecasts would be a thing of the past.
So how did this rule fair? Again, not so well.
The trouble was that deficit reduction proved far harder than anticipated with very
weak potential growth following the financial crisis creating a substantial fiscal drag. Be-
cause the deficit target was always five-years ahead, the point at which structural balance
was achieved kept slipping backward, and the debt target was missed.
The other problem was that big consolidation can always be pencilled in for a couple
of years in the future. The target looks like it will be met, but only if implausible paths
for public spending were realised.
Finally, the government was unable to fudge the forecast for revenue or the economy,
but it was able to make big spending cuts look like a normal baseline - this greatly re-
duced the transparency of policymaking. As the OBR noted, the baseline assumption for
spending in the medium term — years in which there were no detailed fiscal plans —
changed often and became much more complicated.
4.1.5 A Conditional Fiscal Rule - 2015 to 2016
The first Budget of the new Conservative government saw a the introduction of a condi-
tional fiscal rule. It was completely unique, compared with what went before it. For the
first time the rules specified not just the fiscal objective - which was for outright surpluses
- but when it would be allowed to deviate from it. As a recap the rules specified:
• a target for a surplus on public sector net borrowing in 2019-20, and a supplemen-
tary target for public sector net debt to fall as a share of GDP in each year from
2015-16 to 2019-20
• a target, once a surplus is achieved in 2019-20, to run a surplus each subsequent
year as long as the economy remains in normal times To gauge when the economy
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is outside of normal times, a significant negative shock was defined as reducing
real GDP growth to less than 1% (on a rolling 4 quarter-on-4 quarter basis).
It’s worth remembering that this rule was announced during a period of significant
consolidation and intense discussion on the appropriate stance of fiscal policy. A big
contribution to this debate is Portes & Wren-Lewis (2015), who draw various conclusions
from the literature on fiscal policy to devise specific policy recommendations.
They advocate for fiscal rules as a solution to deficit bias and suggest that deficit tar-
geting is superior to debt targeting – that, the reasoning goes, is because deficit targeting
should allow fiscal adjustments to be less sharp and debt can be brought under control in
the medium-term by altering the deficit targets. The authors also conclude that the rule
should give fiscal policy space to support the economy when negative shocks occur —
particularly when interest rates are as low as they can go.
The key features of the government’s fiscal rule, implemented shortly after the paper
was published, look broadly aligned with the recommendations made.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Emmerson et al. (2016) made an assessment of the
fiscal rule in the year after it was announced. The analysis used forecast and outturn
data to identify periods of significant shock, finding that fiscal flexibility would have
been granted during each of the past four decades. This assessment said when deficit
reduction could be abandoned but made no formal attempt to measure the benefit to
demand stabilisation of doing so.
Overall, then, no detailed quantitative assessment has been made of the government’s
fiscal rule. But related research suggests it would be a good rule to investigate and that
methods have been developed making it possible to test whether it might dampen demand
shocks.
A second question worth asking is whether GDP growth is the best indicator to trigger
fiscal flexibility. The output gap is already used to adjust the public finances for the effects
of the economic cycle — helping to determine how much fiscal effort is needed to reach
a particular target for the headline deficit in years to come.
The output gap is also used in the formulation of monetary policy and the literature
records a debate between whether the output gap or growth might be the more appropriate
indicator for setting interest rates Walsh (2003). The drawback with the output gap is
that real-time estimates can be extremely misleading — that’s been shown empirically
by Orphanides & Norden (2002) for the U.S., Ru¨nstler (2002) for the euro area and for
the U.K. in Murray (2014).
As the IFS notes, the output gap is also a difficult concept to explain to the public and
it is also a challenge to estimate objectively. So why should it be considered as a trigger
variable: because growth indicators have drawbacks too.
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First, the cause of the growth shock could matter. If it is because aggregate demand in
the economy has weakened, this calls for fiscal flexibility, to get output back to potential.
If instead, growth has stuttered because the economy’s supply potential has temporarily
weakened, the growth rule would allow a necessary fiscal response to be delayed for no
obvious reason.
Second, should the economy’s potential growth rate permanently slow to below 1%,
the fiscal rule would permit the government to abandon deficit reduction indefinitely.
That’s particularly important now that trend productivity growth appears to have slowed.
Third, it’s possible that growth could fall below trend for cyclical reasons, prompting
a protracted spell of higher unemployment, but not trigger the growth knockout. In that
case fiscal support might be warranted but not granted. The IFS observes that actual data
suggest this isn’t a particularly common occurrence.
4.1.6 A Return to Deficit Targets - 2016 to...
The U.K.’s decision to leave the EU and a new Chancellor at the Treasury prompted yet
another set of fiscal rules. The overarching objective of which is to ”return the public
finances to balance at the earliest possible date in the next Parliament”. HM-Treasury
(2016). The formal definition of a significant shock went, the target slipped backward
and the cyclically adjusted measure of borrowing returned.
Overall, the new rule has delivered substantially more flexibility but is considerably
less onerous than those that went before it. It is also less interesting from a research
standpoint. In what follows I therefore focus on the conditional fiscal rule introduced in
2015.
The questions I attempt to answer are:
• How useful is fiscal flexibility during a downturn?
• Which is a better trigger for fiscal flexibility, growth or slack?
4.2 Methodology
The simulations are conducted in three stages. The first stage involves estimating demand
and supply shocks to the U.K. economy using a Kalman filter, Kalman (1960). The
second step is to use a model to compare the performance of two fiscal rules when faced
with these shocks — one that provides the government with fiscal flexibility when growth
slows, and another which does not. The third stage is to assess the trigger for fiscal
flexibility. I compare the performance of one rule which gives flexibility when growth
slows and another which provides flexibility when the output gap turns negative.
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4.2.1 Part 1: Modelling Approach
Demand and supply shocks to the U.K. economy
Demand and supply shocks to the economy affect the public finances in different
ways. A negative demand shock prompts a cyclical weakness that might be expected to
reverse as tax revenues recover and spending returns to a more normal share of GDP. A
negative supply shock leaves the economy permanently smaller than it otherwise would
have been, creating a structural deterioration in the public finances that won’t improve
without remedial fiscal effort.
So to understand how different fiscal rules might have performed in the past, shocks to
the economy must, as a minimum, be decomposed into either demand or supply shocks.
There are a number of possible paths forward at this juncture. A straightforward approach
would be to use the HP Filter, Hodrick & Prescott (1997), specify a law of motion for
aggregate supply and demand and recover the disturbances from those equations.
Instead, I have used a multivariate Kalman filter. Any filter can be expressed in state
space, including the HP filter, and solved using the Kalman algorithm. It is therefore not
the Kalman algorithm that is desirable, in and of itself. Rather it is the flexibility of state
space which is useful. It allows for much more sophisticated filters to be created and
solved easily. In this case I have sought to include information beyond the path of actual
GDP that is relevant to slack and should have some bearing on its estimation. Specifi-
cally, I have included indicators such as unemployment, inflation and survey measures of
capacity utilisation.
This filter strikes a balance between drawing from a wider range of relevant data and
using so much that availability of that data become a problem. The specification I have
used means shocks can be recovered all the way back to 1965.
This filter is also one of the key methods used by the British government to inform the
official estimates of the output gap that are used to produce the public finances forecast
and estimates of structural borrowing. So, compared with the HP filter, the method I
choose is a step closer to the real world.
A further consideration is that the model selected has different properties regarding
the end-point problem. It is well known, Orphanides (2002), that estimates from the HP
filter tend to be revised - and substantially - when new data arrive. This is true of all
filters, but the HP filter is more likely to allow the level of trend to move to meet the level
of actual GDP at the end of the sample than is the filter specified here. At least that’s
what Murray (2014) shows.
The reason is that there is no prior assumption made by the HP filter that the level
of trend GDP tends to rise over time. The only assumptions made for the purpose of
estimation by the HP filter is that cycles aren’t too big and that trend growth isn’t too
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volatile. Introduce the assumption that trend output is likely to keep rising over time and
the revisions properties change substantially - open output gaps are more likely at the end
of the sample period.
Filters featuring these sorts of assumption were used by Benesˇ et al. (2010) and Lax-
ton & Tetlow (1992), for example. A multivariate version has since been used by Bla-
grave et al. (2015) for a range of countries and Alichi et al. (2017) for the euro area and
U.S. In both cases, the multivariate filter was found to be more reliable in real-time than
univariate statistical methods such as the HP filter.
The model used is illustrated in the following state-space representation.
Signal :gdpt = gdp
∗
t + yt (4.1)
State :gdp∗t+1 = gdp
∗




State :driftt = driftt−1 (4.3)
Signal :yt = 1,t (4.4)
Actual output is constrained to equal the sum of potential output, gdp∗, and the output
gap Kappa is the ratio of the variance of shocks to demand and supply and therefore de-
termines how smooth potential GDP is. This specification of the Kalman filter is known
as the prior-constrained filter as it contains a prior belief about the process driving po-
tential GDP: it’s assumed to be a random walk with drift. Without the inclusion of this
assumption, this specification of the Kalman filter is virtually identical to the HP filter -
and most differences appear towards the end of the estimation period in any case.
From here, additional signal equations are added to the Kalman filter to incorporate
more relevant information about the economic cycle. The equations chosen are a Phillips
relation, an Okun relation and an equation linking capacity utilisation to the output gap.
The filter is estimated from 1965 up to the third quarter of 2017, with the first and last
couple of years of data discarded. Further detail on the multivariate Kalman filter used to
estimate demand shocks to the economy is presented in Murray (2014).
The Kalman filter estimates of the output gap can be used to decompose the actual
GDP growth rate of the economy into cyclical and structural components - those are
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 2 goes further, plotting the shocks to supply and demand recovered from the
Kalman filter estimates. As is plain to see, the 1960s and 1970s were a more volatile
period in the U.K. than during recent times - with the notable exception of the global
financial crisis in 2009.
Since we are trying to understand how different fiscal rules might have performed
faced by the same sequence of shocks as occurred in the past, it’s important to account
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Figure 4.1: Figure shows the contributions to actual GDP growth from growth in demand,
depicted by dark bars, and growth of supply, light bars. The estimates are derived from
a Kalman filter model.
Figure 4.2: The figure plots non-fiscal demand and supply shocks derived from a
Kalman filter.
for the influence of fiscal shocks in the past. In other words, it’s important to clean the
data set to isolate just the shocks that fiscal authorities might have to deal with again.
To remove the influence of fiscal policy, the change in the structural deficit is re-
gressed on the demand shocks recovered from the Kalman filter. What’s left, the residu-
als from that equation, are assumed to be clean. The key assumption here is that changes
to the structural deficit are a suitable proxy for discretionary fiscal policy.
4.2.2 Solution Method
To assess how the fiscal rule might have performed in the past, an economic model is
needed — and its solution method must satisfy two requirements.
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• the shocks to which it is subjected must be unanticipated, which calls for a stochas-
tic rather than deterministic model. The government did not see the global financial
crisis coming, so it mustn’t be able to in the model.
• the model must permit asymmetric responses. Under the fiscal rule, the govern-
ment responds differently to positive shocks from negative ones.
It doesn’t matter at this stage quite which model is used, but the state-contingency
of the policy rule creates a challenge. The fiscal rule is asymmetric - deficit reduction
happens when growth is strong, but not when growth is slow. Any single model with
state-contingent policy rules that cannot be differentiated has no log-linear approxima-
tion, meaning standard solution methods cannot be used.
To address this I specify two separate models and switch between them. In one, the
fiscal policy rule is for deficit reduction, in the other no effort is made to shrink the deficit.
Both policy rules are differentiable and so simulations can proceed, one quarter at a time
and switching between models as and when growth drops below the knockout threshold.
To run simulations I have used tools more usually applied in the literature on mone-
tary policy - in particular in the analysis of the zero-lower bound of interest rates. Out of
necessity, new methods have been developed that allow for the simple solution of models
with occasionally-binding constraints - Guerrieri & Iacoviello (2015) have been instru-
mental in driving this field forward and opening it up to a broader set of researchers.
The authors show that a model with occasionally-binding constraints can be solved
using a piecewise linear perturbation method. The difference, when compared with the
naive solution, is that agents are able to form expectations over when the regime will
switch back. This is much more realistic than an assumption that fiscal laxity will con-
tinue indefinitely.
The Guerrieri and Iacoviello algorithm depends on two assumptions. That no shocks
are expected in future - a standard assumption - and that if a jump is made from the
reference to alternative regime, that a jump back will occur at some point in the future.
The algorithm computes estimates of how long it will take to return to the reference
regime using a guess and verify approach depending on the starting conditions in any
given quarter and the shock experienced in that quarter. When applied, this solution
method is shown to match more analytically sophisticated but computationally demand-
ing methods such as dynamic programming.
4.2.3 Other Applications of the Solution Method
The OccBin toolkit has been used to answer a range of policy questions. The creators of
the toolkit themselves have published research applying this solution method, including
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Guerrieri & Iacoviello (2017). In that analysis it is shown how the impact of loosening
of collateral constraints had a smaller effect on household consumption in the run up
to the global financial crisis, than the sudden binding of those constraints had during the
downturn. That asymmetry helps explain the dynamics of the financial crisis. Perhaps the
most obvious application is to the zero-lower bound of monetary policy. In one regime
monetary policy is effective, but when rates approach zero, the central bank is no longer
able to provide additional support to aggregate demand.
An early research effort on this topic is Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), who use
a simple model together with the OccBin toolkit to understand how large shocks to the
U.S. economy need to be to arrive at the zero-lower bound and how long the constraint
might persist. They also uncover early results showing that the fiscal impact multiplier is
around 1.7 when rates are at the ZLB, compared with 0.5 in normal times.
Other investigations into fiscal policy at the lower bound using the OccBin toolkit
have been published, too. Flotho (2018) find that fiscal policy plays an important role in
stabilising the economy when monetary policy is constrained and that a properly designed
policy can shorten the spell spent subject to the constraint. Bhattarai & Egorov (2016)
explore the implications of trade elasticities for optimal fiscal policy when rates are at the
ZLB.
Finally, an OECD analysis, Claveres & Stra´sky` (2018), explores the benefits to de-
mand stabilisation of a pooled unemployment insurance mechanism for the euro area
when monetary policy is constrained by the lower bound of interest rates. Again, the
OccBin toolkit is used to solve this non-linear model. It is shown that such a scheme
would materially reduce output losses, especially in the periphery, when the economy
experiences a negative shock.
In short, there is plenty of research using the OccBin toolkit to assess constraints on
the operation of monetary policy and the role of fiscal policy when rates are at the ZLB.
That’s not the case for analysis of constraints on fiscal policy, such as the state-contingent
rules explored here.
4.3 The Model
For both regimes I use a simple reduced-form model of the U.K. economy. The ideal
model of the economy would accurately capture the key mechanisms that determine the
impact of fiscal policy on the economy. For a start, that means it must have a represen-
tation of the fiscal impact multiplier - the force with which changes to tax and spending
depress or boost output.
It must then capture the dynamics of how the economy adjusts to those shocks. Mon-
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etary policy is one of the key adjustment mechanisms for the economy - the ideal model
would replicate the Bank of England’s broad understanding of how interest rate changes
affect growth and inflation. Monetary policy also affects the economy via shifts in the
exchange rate, so it is important to capture that channel of transmission also.
I have chosen a small, tractable model that broadly matches the simulation proper-
ties of monetary policy shocks in COMPASS. In other words, the model captures the
cushioning impact of monetary policy on an economy suffering fiscal shocks well. But
it does not attempt to model all shocks that might affect the U.K. economy. The general
approach to parameterisation is to draw reasonable estimates from the literature for the
U.K. economy, where possible, or elsewhere if estimates are unavailable.
Aggregate demand in the economy is given by an IS equation, relating the output gap,
y, to lags and expectations of itself, real interest rates, r, changes in the exchange rate,
q, discretionary fiscal policy measures, f , and a stochastic shock, y. The parameters
αy, αr, αq, and αNR determine the degree of forward-looking behaviour, the interest rate
elasticity of demand, the responsiveness of output to the exchange rate and the fiscal
impact multiplier respectively.
yt = αyyt−1 + (1− αy)yt+1|t − αrrt − αq∆qt−1 + alphaNRft + yt (4.5)
The degree of forward-looking behaviour plays an important role in determining the
persistence of shocks to demand and the adjustment of the economy to them. Empirical
evidence shows that adjustment occurs more slowly than purely forward-looking mod-
els would suggest. For example, the habit formation model of household consumption,
which implies slow adjustment to income shocks, is a better fit with the data than a
forward-looking model, Fuhrer (2000).
The chosen parameter for the degree to which agents in the economy are forward
looking is 0.85. That, in combination with other parameter choices drawn from the lit-
erature is consistent with the general response of the economy to interest rate shocks
contained in COMPASS. It is also close to the parameter chosen by Batini & Haldane
(1999), which they consider to be empirically plausible.
The COMPASS model contains a habit formation parameter, which is 0.7. But, in that
modeI, additional persistence appears to be achieved by using forcing process equations
in the specification of shocks. This means overall persistence is likely to be a little higher
and that is the reason for the bigger parameter selected. In other words, persistence is a
feature of both models, but it is introduced in different places in COMPASS compared to
the model used here.
A crucial assumption that governs the response of the economy to fiscal policy is the
interest rate elasticity of demand. That is a function of structural parameters in COM-
PASS, but in this reduced form model it is captured by a single parameter.
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The evidence on the effectiveness of monetary policy in the U.K. is a little thin, but
a recent contribution to the literature, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2016) suggests the impact
of monetary policy shocks on demand and inflation is substantial. It also contains a
summary of related research for the U.K. and U.S. — the estimates vary widely.
The parameter related to the interest rate elasticity of demand in this model is set at
0.1. This is consistent with Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2016), who find that a one-percentage
point jump in the cost of borrowing, maintained for a year, depresses output by 0.1%
in the following quarter, reaching a peak impact of 0.4% on the level of output. Again,
together with other parameters of the IS-relation, the impact of a monetary policy shock
on the economy is qualitatively similar to that produced by the Bank of England’s fore-
casting model, COMPASS - see Burgess et al. (2013).
How currency movements affect the economy is captured in the IS relation, but the
right coefficient is harder to judge. Britain’s decision to withdraw from the EU is a useful
illustrative example of this problem. The pound depreciated by between 10% and 20%,
depending on the starting point, in the run up to and following the Brexit vote. But this
has not translated into a surge in exports and net trade.
Ordinarily, a depreciation can lift the prices of exported goods and services in local
currency terms — maintaining prices in foreign currency terms — and this thickens profit
margins. The bigger profits make it desirable to lift production, in order to make more.
Yet, businesses do not yet seem to have invested in additional capacity.
The reason may be that the depreciation may reflect a long-term hit to the economy -
trade will be harder after Britain leaves the EU and so the currency has adjusted to reflect
that. In years to come, exporters will find it harder to sell and so this limits the incentive
to raise production.
Meanwhile, the weaker currency has raised import costs, dragging on household con-
sumption growth. In this case it is perfectly possible that the depreciation has depressed
output rather than lifting it. The source of the shock, may therefore matter, meaning the
choice of parameter ought to reflect the shocks assessed using the model.
In the simulations, I’m interested in how monetary policy and the exchange rate cush-
ion the impact of fiscal policy, not how risk premium shocks can affect demand. So this
argues for a negative coefficient - a lower exchange rate should lift demand. The magni-
tude of the coefficient is broadly consistent with Murray (2012), which reviews evidence
from single equation estimates and a structural VAR.
The sections above have concerned how demand might adjust to a general shock. But
what about the immediate impact of a discretionary fiscal tightening or loosening? That is
captured by the fiscal impact multiplier. If a government cuts spending, the mechanical
impact on GDP may not be one-for-one because fewer imports will be consumed, for
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example. But the withdrawal of demand could also prompt belt tightening by other agents
in the economy, lifting the impact.
The choice of parameter is an important one and it depends on a wide number of
influences. For example, the type of spending measure is likely to be signifiocant — OBR
(2010) put the impact of investment spending at unity, with welfare and departmental
spending at 0.6; but closer to 0.3 for income tax changes. More recent estimates OBR
(2015) put the impact of departmental spending cuts a little lower at 0.45, reflecting the
impact of prices adjustment.
The timing may also matter. Auerbach & Gorodnichenko (2011) find that the fis-
cal multiplier can be small during expansions but significantly bigger than unity during
recessions. Blanchard & Leigh (2013) also find that the multiplier can be large. And
Murray (2012) shows that the distribution of estimates of the impact multiplier is skewed
toward being larger rather than smaller in New Zealand, a small open economy.
Another way to think about the fiscal impact multiplier is in terms of Ricardian equiv-
alence. If every agent in the economy is rational and optimising, the impact of a fiscal
shock should be small. After all, a tax cut now means a tax hike later on — households
should save the windfall in readiness for the burden that will be borne later on. But if
some proportion of households does not optimise, as seems to be the case, fiscal policy
does have an impact.
The evidence shows that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. Haug (2016) tests
equivalence using a measure of tax shocks developed by Romer & Romer (2010). The
results show that Ricardian Equivalence is rejected and that the associated fiscal multi-
plier varies over time. Hayo & Neumeier (2017) also reject full Ricardian Equivalence on
the basis that many people surveyed in Germany did not adjust their behaviour to account
for the run up in debt during the global financial crisis.
Fiscal policy is subject to strict assumptions in COMPASS. Full Ricardian Equiva-
lence is assumed, meaning the impact of discretionary fiscal policy is not captured di-
rectly. Instead, the Bank of England depends on a suite of other models to inform its
judgement on the impact of spending and tax shocks. This is one other reason why
COMPASS is not suitable for the simulation exercise undertaken here.
Since much of the recent and substantial fiscal consolidation has been focused on
changes to departmental spending, which has a larger multiplier than tax measures, and
it seems likely that the impact of fiscal policy may have been bigger than the OBR expects
it to be in the future, at certain times in the past, I have chosen an impact multiplier of
0.6. A spending cut of 1% of GDP therefore has an immediate impact of 0.6% on the
level of GDP. In time, that impact shrinks as monetary policy reacts to the shock and the
economy adjusts.
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Inflation is divided into two types — domestically-generated and that originating
from beyond the country’s borders. A Phillips curve relates domestically-generated in-
flation, piD, to a lag of itself, the output gap and a stochastic shock, piD. The parameters
βpi and βy determine the degree of forward-looking behaviour in price setting and the
sensitivity of inflation to slack respectively. The equation is presented as deviations from
the inflation target.
While the Phillips curve contains a substantial forward looking element, it is assumed
that inflation expectations are anchored on the target. Since this is assumed to be a
constant, it means expectations drop out when the equation is log-linearised around its
steady state. In other words, the monetary policy framework in the U.K. is assumed to be
credible and stable in the model.
piDt = βpipi
D
t−1 + βyyt−2 + 
piD
t (4.6)
The persistence of inflation — seasonally-adjusted and on a quarterly basis — is
lower than that of the output gap and the parameter chosen for lagged inflation, 0.6,
reflects this. The persistence of headline inflation is lower still, thanks to the temporary
influence of shocks from import prices and energy costs on quarterly price changes.
The sensitivity of domestically generated inflation to the output gap is the parameter
determining the slope of the Phillips curve. The parameter chosen is close to that used
by the OBR in its small model of the economy, Murray (2012).
Headline inflation, pit, includes external influences on prices owing to movements in
the exchange rate over the past year and additional shocks, denoted by pi. The sensitivity
of inflation to the exchange rate is determined by , which partly reflects the import inten-
sity of consumer goods and services. Other external shocks, such as those to the price of
energy are captured by the error term.
pit = pi
D
t βq∆qt−1/t−4 + 
pi
t (4.7)
The Bank Rate, i, is assumed to follow a forward-looking Taylor rule. It is a function
of lagged interest rates — to capture inertia related to policy uncertainty — the expected
output gap, the expected deviation of domestically-generated inflation from target and
can be subject to a stochastic shock, i.
In the model, the persistence parameter is set at 0.9, reflecting the substantial degree
of inertia in policymaking. That’s very close to the parameter estimated in COMPASS.
The forecast horizon is selected based on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
and the fact that the Bank of England targets forecasts of inflation, not actual inflation.
The inclusion of the output gap and inflation in the central bank’s reaction function
are consistent with one another - a closed output gap will lead to inflation settling on the
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2% target. It’s worth knowing then that when the economy is experiencing a demand
shock, it is the sum of the coefficients on output and inflation that determine the amount
of monetary activism.
When the economy experiences other shocks as well, there is the possibility that a
persistent period of above target inflation will coincide with weakness in demand. In this
case the central bank must balance its desire to return inflation to target with a need to
keep output stable. Such a trade-off has been assessed by Carney (2017), with reference
to the sterling-induced period of above-target inflation and weak demand.
Because I am primarily interested in the impact of shocks that do not create this trade-
off, the precise weighting is not too important to the results. The parameter chosen is a
half.
it = δiIt−1 + (1− δi)δyyt+2|t + (1− δi)δpi(pit+4|t) + it (4.8)
The real interest rate is the difference between nominal rates and expected inflation.
rt = it − pit+1|t (4.9)
Foreign interest rates are exogenous to the model and follow an autoregressive pro-
cess:











The real exchange rate is determined by relative interest rates and prices. The short-
term dynamics are driven by a real uncovered interest rate parity condition and the
medium-term anchor is purchasing power parity, toward which the exchange rate grad-
ually converges. The equation is linearised around that steady state and the speed of
convergence is determined by the parameter, ψq. The exchange rate can be subject to
shocks, which are denoted by q.
The choice of convergence speed is based on the general view in the literature - see
Rogoff (1996) - that the half-life of shocks to PPP is somewhere between three and five
years. The parameter chosen here is consistent with a half-life of four years.
qt = qt+1|t + (it − pit+1|t)− (ift − pift+1|t)− ψqqt+1 + qt (4.12)
Public sector net borrowing as a share of GDP, pbt, is simply the sum of the cyclical
component of public borrowing, cbt, and the structural part, sbt.
pbt = cbt + sbt (4.13)
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The cyclical budget deficit is a function of the average output gap over the past four
quarters multiplied by the cyclical adjustment coefficient, θCA1, and the average output
gap in the four quarters before that, multiplied by the cyclical adjustment coefficient,
θCA2. The cyclical adjustment parameters are drawn from Helgadottir et al (2012).
cbt = θCA1(yt/t−3t/4)θCA2(yt−4/t−7t/4) (4.14)
The structural budget deficit is a function of itself and discretionary fiscal measures.
The structural balance is subject to two shocks The first is fiscal and denoted by sbt . The
other reflects shifts in the denominator - potential GDP and is denoted by y∗ .
How much the structural balance deteriorates when the potential size of the economy
experiences a negative shock is given by τ . The logic is the same as that pertaining to
the cyclical adjustment coefficients. Spending rises as a share of GDP and the tax take
falls when growth slows. The difference is that it doesn’t automatically get better. The
coefficient chosen is 0.7.
sbt = sbt−1 − ft + sbt + τy
∗
(4.15)
Except the fiscal policy rules, the remaining equations are identities included only
to allow the GDP growth condition to operate. The change in the log of potential GDP,
gdp∗, between the current time period and four periods ago is given by g, the long-term
trend GDP growth rate analogous to the drift parameter of the multivariate Kalman filter
presented in Murray (2014), and the sequence of shocks to the level of potential GDP
over the preceding 4 quarters.









The growth of actual GDP is simply the above combined with the change in the output
gap over the same period. This is also illustrated back in Figure 1.
∆gdpt = ∆gdp
∗
t + (yt − yt−4) (4.17)
The indicator for the fiscal rule, rulegdpt, is the 4-quarter rolling average of the annual
GDP growth rate, given by:
rulegdpt = ∆gdpt/t−3t/4 (4.18)
The two models that capture the reference and alternative regimes differ only in the
specification of the fiscal rule. The fiscal rule in question instructed the government to
balance the books over five years when growth is above 1% and provides fiscal flexibility
when the pace of expansion drops below that. The two equations which govern fiscal
effort attempt to replicate this rule.
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4.3.1 Fiscal Regime-Switching Model with a Growth Knock-Out
In the reference regime, when the economy is growing normally, fiscal policy eliminates
a proportion of the structural deficit or surplus in every quarter. Though the rule refers to
the headline deficit, the cycle has usually run its course within five years, in which case
targeting the structural deficit is consistent with targeting the headline deficit.
The speed of deficit reduction is determined by and the parameter is chosen reflecting
the revealed preference of the Coalition government — to eliminate the structural deficit
in a five-year period.
ft = ζsbsbt + 
f
t (4.19)
In the alternative regime, when growth is weak, the automatic stabilisers are permitted




A constraint is specified to determine when the alternative regime is in place.
rulegdpt < 1% = TRUE (4.21)
The relaxation condition determines when the reference regime returns.
rulegdpt > 2% = TRUE (4.22)
This latter constraint is not actually described in the fiscal rule itself, but some as-
sumption over when fiscal tightening can resume is needed. The choice of 2% reflects
the notion that the economic recovery should be underway before tightening begins —
growth of that speed is roughly consistent with the trend rate in the U.K. A choice of, say
2.5%, would delay further the implementation of consolidation.
4.3.2 A Fiscal Regime-Switching Model with an Output Gap Knock-
Out
The model is identical to the model described above, but the equations needed to calculate
rule GDP are dropped. The 4 quarter rolling average of the output gap is used to switch
between the reference and alternative regimes. Given the U.K. economy’s trend rate of
growth, an output gap of about −1% is comparable to the growth knock out. It is also
assumed that the recovery is almost complete before returning to the reference regime.
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Constraint :(yt/t−3)/4 < −1% = TRUE (4.23)
ConstraintRelax :(yt/t−3)/4 > −0.1% = TRUE (4.24)
In both models, no effort is made to assess the implications for debt or the feedback
of that to the economy. Experience suggests that higher but sustainable debt has not had
a particularly damaging influence on the U.K. economy. That doesn’t mean it would
always be costless, as it is possible that debt servicing costs rise sharply once a threshold
is met. Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) found evidence that countries with debt in excess of
90% of GDP tend to grow more slowly than those that do not. The U.K has skirted
that level but not breached it since the global financial crisis. Subsequent studies have
also cast doubt on the existence of that threshold. E´gert (2015) finds that the nonlinear
relationship between debt and growth is ”quasi inexistent”. Still, this feature could be
incorporated as an occasionally binding constrain. I leave it as a possible avenue for
further research.
Why not use a bigger model, like COMPASS? One reason that is not possible is that
the Bank’s main model does not capture the impact of fiscal policy on the economy very
well.
But there are other reasons to use something else - the purpose of the model is very
different. COMPASS is intended to capture an enormous range of shocks to the U.K.
economy, which are relevant to the conduct of monetary policy. I am interested in just a
few.
For example, how wage growth responds to cost mark-up shocks among importing
firms may be interesting to policymakers, but it’s of no relevance to gauging the impact of
fiscal policy on the economy. The additional complexity of COMPASS comes therefore
comes at the significant expense of tractability. Complexity makes it harder to interrogate
the simulation results.
Tractability is a good thing, but not if it compromises the ability of the model to
approximate the real world. In other words, is a small model too small to be useful?
The answer is no. Del Negro & Schorfheide (2012) show that the forecast performance
of a medium-sized model like COMPASS, but in this case the Smets & Wouters (2003)
model used for a time by the European Central Bank, isn’t vastly different to a small-
scale model. The latter performed slightly better at longer forecast horizons, while the
former did better at shorter horizons.
Separately, it’s worth considering evidence on model selection from another strand of
literature - Structural Vector Auto-Regression Modelling. SVARs are typically used for
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assessing the sources of shocks to the economy, rather than for policy analysis. , there is
a link between the two — many DSGE models can be represented as SVARS, albeit with
fairly onerous restrictions Giacomini (2013).
SVAR models are often small, featuring just three or four variables, but they can often
explain a big proportion of the variability of the data. Even early examples in the litera-
ture, such as Shapiro & Watson (1988) show that the bulk of business cycle fluctuations
can be explained by just a handful of shocks. This suggests that a parsimonious approach
to modelling has empirical support.
As a very rough gauge, it is possible to assess the fit of the model to the data by
comparing the volatility of simulated variables with those observed in reality. There are
some caveats, of course. First, neither fiscal policy rule implemented in the simulations
is comparable to how policy was conducted in reality over the past half century - the
rule changed over time, for example. And I have already stripped out the influence of
discretionary fiscal policy from the shock sequence applied to the model. This renders
meaningless a direct comparison output gap volatilities – and indeed they differ materi-
ally.
Yet in other respects, this diagnostic is helpful. The volatility of inflation in the
simulations should be well below that observed in reality because only economic demand
and supply shocks, not import cost or oil price shocks are implemented in the simulations
run below. And, reassuringly, that is what we see. The standard deviation of the inflation
gap is 0.71 in the growth knockout simulations run below, considerably smaller than the
2.32 standard deviation observed in reality.
A more meaningful comparison perhaps is of the volatility of the interest rate gap. A
big difference here would imply that monetary policy is conducted very differently in the
model to how it is in real life. The standard deviation of the interest rate gap in the model,
when a fiscal growth knockout is in place is 1.82, while it is 1.87 in real life – the two are
therefore pretty close. In the simulations that ask more of monetary policy because fiscal
policy tries to eliminate the deficit even during a downturn, the standard deviation of the
interest rate gap rises above that observed in real life, to 2.26. This makes some logical
sense, too.
4.4 Simulations
4.4.1 Part 1: The benefit of fiscal flexibility with a growth knock out
To assess the potential benefits of fiscal policy flexibility I assess how the growth knock
out rule performs in the face of unexpected supply and demand shocks that actually
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Figure 4.3: The figure shows how different policy rules affect the stance of fiscal policy.
The solid line is net fiscal loosening or tightening as a percent of GDP under a balanced
budget rule. The dashed line is under a regime in which policy tightening can be aban-
doned when growth slows.
occurred in history (from 1968 to 2015). The results are compared to a simulation in
which the model is the same but no knockout exists and the government targets a balanced
structural deficit at the five-year horizon. The results are plotted in the figures below and
there are several noteworthy findings.
First, compared with targeting a balanced budget, the growth knockout rule affords
significant fiscal flexibility. I find that the growth knockout might have been in operation
around a quarter of the time between 1968 and 2016. That flexibility would have been
granted during economic downswings in every decade.
A few of specific periods stand out. First, the growth knockout would have applied
during the early 1980s, which is an interesting episode in Britain’s fiscal history. It is
now thought that austerity, especially, in 1981 was an error Nickell (2006) and that the
364 economists who signed an open letter of complaint, were right to do so. Had the
growth-knockout rule been in place then, the letter might never have been written because
austerity would have been delayed.
Significant flexibility would also have been granted during the global financial crisis,
but also during the euro crisis of 2011. Again, these are interesting periods of Britain’s
past. The actual fiscal response to the crisis was to ease policy, just as the growth knock-
out would have allowed. Consolidation was then initiated in 2010, again, as the growth
knockout would indicate. But, had the growth knockout been in place, the tightening
could have been abandoned in 2011 as the euro crisis was raging and would not have
been resumed until the worst of it was over. Instead, the government pressed ahead with
discretionary fiscal tightening, mostly via spending restraint.
So a growth knock-out rule would likely have afforded fiscal flexibility at times that
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Figure 4.4: The figure shows two paths of the output gap under different fiscal regimes
Figure 4.5: The figure shows two paths of the inflation deviation from target under dif-
ferent fiscal regimes
it may have been needed. But what difference would it have made? The simulations
show that the margin of spare capacity is smaller during downturns when fiscal policy
was more flexible. That is consistent with what economic theory would suggest.
A separate finding, which follows from the narrower margin of economic slack during
downturns afforded by fiscal flexibility, is that inflation deviation from the target would
be smaller as well. That is illustrated in 4.5.
4.4.2 Part 2: The benefit of fiscal flexibility with an output gap knock
out
What the simulations shows is that, by and large, the knockout would be triggered by
the output gap at approximately the same times as it would have been by GDP growth.
That suggests that the distinction between demand and supply shocks to growth isn’t too
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Figure 4.6: The figure plots discretionary fiscal policy tightening or loosening as a share
of GDP under three regimes – a balanced budget rule, a growth knowckout rule and an
output gap knockout rule.
Figure 4.7: The figure shows that the output gap would have closed sooner if the margin
of spare capacity is used to determine when fiscal tightening begins after a negative
shock. The output gap under all three policy regimes is plotted as a percent of GDP.
important — that may be because demand and supply shocks tend to go in the same
direction during deep recessions. The path of fiscal tightening under all three regimes —
structural balance targeting, growth knockout and output gap knockout are illustrated in
Figure 4.6.
A second observation is that the output gap rule would have delayed fiscal consolida-
tion right the way up to 2015, following the global financial crisis. That’s a reflection of
the assumption that the output gap is closed before tightening occurs, which is arbitrary.
As the chart below illustrates, the output gap would have closed far sooner following the
financial crisis if fiscal consolidation had been delayed.
Of the two findings, it is the former that is more important. That the output gap
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doesn’t offer any obvious benefits compared with GDP growth as a trigger for fiscal
flexibility is useful, since GDP is far easier to measure and communicate than the output
gap. It is less useful to know that the recovery would have been swifter if the output gap
trigger has been used because it depends crucially on the assumption about how long the
government waits before initiating fiscal tightening.
Neither finding means the output gap should be disregarded as an indicator altogether.
Some estimate of spare capacity, implicit or explicit, is always needed to judge how
much fiscal effort will have to be made to achieve headline budget deficit targets — that’s
because revenue and spending are affected by the economic cycle.
4.5 Conclusion
It has been shown that a state-contingent fiscal policy rule can be embedded in a small
model of the economy and solved using linear perturbation methods. The resulting sim-
ulations show that a growth knockout affording fiscal flexibility in the face of significant
shocks to the economy can make recessions shallower.
Though there are theoretical benefits to using the output gap as a growth trigger, rather
than GDP growth, in practice the differences appear to be quite small. It may therefore
be simpler and more transparent just to let GDP growth determine when fiscal flexibility
is warranted.
Given the literature on the merits of deficit rather than debt targeting, the presence of
parameters in the rule that could be flexed to manage debt levels in the long-term and the
finding that the knockout helps stabilise demand, the government’s rule doesn’t look too
bad.
One problem throughout the modelling exercise is that the government has stated
when the deficit targeting can be relaxed, but not when it should bind again. Reasonable
assumptions have been made for the purposes of running the simulations - that the gov-
ernment doesn’t tighten into an ongoing downturn - but the rule would probably benefit
from stating that clearly.
The flexibility of the linear perturbation solution algorithm means there are plenty of
avenues for further research. The models used here assume that the fiscal multipliers are
the same both during recessions and in normal times - further research could flex this
assumption.
Another path forward would be to assess the interaction between fiscal and monetary
policy at the zero lower bound. In the analysis presented here it is assumed the central
bank finds other effective ways to ease policy when rates are at rock bottom - that may
not be a reasonable assumption.
5
Conclusions and future work
5.1 Summary of findings
In chapter two I presented and estimated a small model of the New Zealand economy.
I then ran a number of fiscal consolidation scenarios and used the results to show the
sensitivity of the fiscal impact multiplier and the associated cumulative output losses to
uncertainty over the model parameters.
The key findings are that uncertainty surrounding the effects of fiscal consolidations
on output can be attributed to several model parameters and that a bad outcome is likely
to be worse than a good outcome is to be better. I find that, if monetary policy were to
be constrained by the zero-lower bound, the estimated fiscal impact multiplier for New
Zealand would be broadly consistent with estimates of the fiscal multiplier in a number
of other OECD countries in that position.
Overall, the evidence suggests that fiscal policy makers should be sensitive to the
prevailing economic environment when determining the fiscal stance and work closely
with central banks if the worst outcomes are to be avoided.
In chapter three I identified three sources of output gap revision - the arrival of new
data, revisions to past data and shifts in model specification. I showed that it is the arrival
of new data that matters the most - the benefit of hindsight allows us to say with much
greater accuracy whether growth was sustainable or not. This uncertainty carries over to
estimates of structural borrowing, complicating fiscal policymaking.
I also demonstrated that the assumptions underpinning some methods mean they are
more likely to be revised and, while other methods are less prone to changes, they may
not be any more useful in forecasting the path of actual GDP - so no method should be
discarded based only on its tendency to be revised.
A wide range of information should be brought to bear on the assessment of slack in
the economy. In chapter three I develop a multivariate Kalman filter model, which incor-
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porates data on GDP, inflation, capacity utilisation and unemployment, while allowing
for the application of judgement on the underlying process driving productivity growth
and the relative importance of each signal from the data — it is still in use by the U.K.
government some four years later.
In chapter four I showed that a state-contingent fiscal policy rule can be embedded
in a small model of the economy and solved using linear perturbation methods. The
resulting simulations show that a growth knockout affording fiscal flexibility in the face
of significant shocks to the economy can make recessions shallower.
Though there are theoretical benefits to using the output gap as a growth trigger, rather
than GDP growth, in practice the differences appear to be quite small. It may therefore
be simpler and more transparent just to let GDP growth determine when fiscal flexibility
is warranted. On balance, the knock-out mechanism introduced in the U.K. in 2015 looks
like a worthwhile innovation and it is a pity it was abandoned a year later.
5.2 Final remarks
Finance ministries must not operate in a vacuum. There are very clear benefits to macroe-
conomic policy coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities, as chapter two il-
lustrates. One possible logical step forward would be for a process to be put in place by
which the central bank assesses its capacity to offset fiscal tightening before that adjust-
ment takes place.
Chapter three demonstrated that output gap uncertainty is a major headache for poli-
cymakers. It also showed that all forecasts for the economy embody a judgement about
slack, whether explicit or implicit. Rather than dismiss output gaps as too unreliable to
be of use, it would more constructive to keep on refining the methods used to estimate it.
Fiscal rules are intended to bolster credibility, yet they tend to be broken. Specifying
the circumstances in which that is ok might mean they endure a little longer than they
have in the past. The findings of chapter four suggest that simple is probably best when
it comes to defining a trigger for fiscal flexibility. Central banks spend a lot of time ex-
plaining how they will respond in different situations. Why shouldn’t finance ministries
define reaction functions too?
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